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Abstract
Bitcoin paper, published under a pseudonym Satoshi Nakamoto, opened a new era; cryp-
tocurrencies, blockchain and distributed ledger technologies that are aiming distributed
trust model. Even if there has been an ongoing extensive discussion both on the origin
and the future about these developing technologies, number of products, studies and
projects are increasing day by day. Among these the most crucial one is crypto wallets
since the distributed trust and privacy preserving solutions are all relies on the underly-
ing cryptographic primitives and the corresponding cryptographic keys. Almost all the
cryptocurrencies require their users individually manage their own cryptographic keys
or recommend use of cryptocurrency wallets. A cryptocurrency wallet or shortly, crypto
wallet, has to generate and store one or more public-private keys and corresponding ad-
dresses. These keys authenticate corresponding transactions, hence any adversary who
gains access to a wallet may seize all the assets secured with them. Therefore, cryp-
tocurrency wallet solutions and products should be carefully analyzed and better to be
certified if possible from the very beginning.
In this thesis, we mainly focus on to what extend and how a cryptocurrency wallet’s
security analysis should be pursued. In order to formally portray the analysis framework,
we propose to follow the Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation framework. CC evaluation
framework is a formal evaluation methodology. For this purpose, assumptions, risks,
threats and security vulnerabilities of the wallets will be defined. Also, objectives showing
how these threats will be countered inside the wallet and what kind of measures should be
taken by the environment and users will be detailed. In order to understand the security
requirements, blockchain technology and Bitcoin which is the leading cryptocurrency will
be explained and cryptocurrency wallets will be classified. In addition, we are going to
propose a secure hardware wallet design in terms of physical and logical requirements.
Then, we will compare the proposed wallet with other hardware wallets on the market.
We believe that this thesis may be basic resource for creating standardized CC documents
such as Protection Profile(PP), Security Target(ST) etc. Furthermore, this study would
be a brief source for cryptocurrency wallets’ design, test and analysis phases.
Keywords: bitcoin, blockchain, common criteria, cryptocurrrency, wallet, security prob-
lem, objectives
Ortak Kriterler Çerçevesi İçinde Güvenli Donanım Kripto Para
Cüzdanı
Yasir Emre Bulut
Öz
Satoshi Nakamoto takma adıyla yayınlanan Bitcoin makalesi dağıtık güven modelini
amaçlayan kripto para birimi, blokzincir ve dağıtık kayıt teknolojilerinin ortaya çık-
tığı yeni bir çığır açmıştır. Bu gelişmekte olan teknolojiler hakkında hem kaynak hem
de gelecek ile ilgili kapsamlı bir tartışma olsa bile, ürün sayısı, çalışmalar ve projeler
gün geçtikçe artmaktadır. Bunlardan en önemlisi, kripto cüzdanlarıdır ki dağıtık güven
ve mahremiyet koruma çözümleri, temel kriptografik ilkellere ve bunlara karşılık gelen
kriptografik anahtarlara dayanır. Neredeyse tüm kripto para birimleri, kullanıcılarının
bireysel olarak kendi kriptografik anahtarlarını yönetmelerini gerektirir ya da kripto para
birimi cüzdanlarını kullanmalarını önerir. Bir kripto para cüzdanı veya kısaca kripto cüz-
danı, bir veya daha fazla özel-açık anahtar ve ilgili adresleri oluşturmak ve depolamak
zorundadır. Bu anahtarlar, kripto para işlemlerini onaylamak için kullanıldığından cüz-
dana erişen herhangi bir düşman, anahtarlarla güvence altına alınan tüm varlıkları ele
geçirebilir. Bu nedenle, kripto para cüzdan çözümleri ve ürünleri dikkatli bir şekilde
analiz edilmeli ve mümkünse en baştan sertifikalandırılmalıdır.
Bu tezde, esas olarak bir kripto para cüzdanının güvenlik analizinin ne kadar derin ve
nasıl yapılması gerektiğine odaklanıyoruz. Analiz çerçevesini tasvir etmek için Ortak
Kriterler (CC) Değerlendirme yöntemini takip etmeyi öneriyoruz. CC değerlendirme
çerçevesi, resmi bir değerlendirme metodolojisidir. Bu amaçla, cüzdanların varsayımları,
riskleri, tehditleri ve güvenlik açıkları tanımlanacaktır. Ayrıca, tehditlerin cüzdan içinde
nasıl önleneceğini ve çevre ve kullanıcılar tarafından ne tür önlemler alınması gerektiğini
gösteren hedefler ayrıntılı olarak açıklanacaktır. Güvenlik gereksinimlerini anlamak için,
blokzincir teknolojisi ve önde gelen kripto para birimi olan Bitcoin açıklanacak ve kripto
para cüzdanları sınıflandırılacaktır. Ayrıca, fiziksel ve mantıksal gereksinimler açısından
güvenli bir donanım cüzdan tasarımı önereceğiz. Ardından, önerilen cüzdanı pazardaki
diğer donanım cüzdanlarıyla karşılaştıracağız. Bu tezin, Koruma Profili, Güvenlik Hedefi
gibi standartlaştırılmış CC dokümanları oluşturmak için temel bir kaynak olabileceğine
inanıyoruz. Ayrıca, bu çalışma kripto para cüzdanlarının tasarım, test ve analiz aşamaları
için başlıca bir kaynak olacaktır.
Anahtar Sözcükler: bitcoin, blokzincir, ortak kriterler, kripto para birimi, kripto cüz-
dan, güvenlik problemi, güvenlik hedefi
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Recording transactions and exchanges have been an important issue since ancient times.
A ledger is the solution to record transactions and exchanges so that anyone could easily
access the records when needed. While providing availability by easy access, safety is
another concern for ledgers against malicious people since it could have sensitive and
personal information. There have been significant improvements in terms of safety. In
finance, listing and adding entries describing each asset or transaction is called single
entry bookkeeping. Besides, if there is separation between assets and liabilities, each
entry has a match on the other side and the sum of each side is equal, this ledger is
called double entry bookkeeping. Also, triple entry bookkeeping which is an extension
of the double-entry bookkeeping has been used for centuries to enhance security. While
single entry systems are open to forgery and understanding errors are hard to detect,
double entry systems are also vulnerable to forgery if there is no verification or proof of
recorded transactions [12]. Even though triple entry systems are not secure enough and
require trusted and neutral third party, they are harder to dispute and more secure than
the double entry systems [13].
Development of technology offers better solutions for traditional methods. Instead of
using slow and risky systems, distributed ledger technologies offering low risk, efficient
control and more reliability are becoming widespread. Computer technology innovation
enables digital media to replace the paper. On the other hand, blockchain technology
enables digital media to be shared across the network all around the world. Network
participants contribute to the blockchain system and all changes are reflected throughout
1
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the ledger network. The security is maintained cryptographically by miners who solve
complex hash sequences. These contributions make distributed ledgers to be preferred
for trustless payment networks without any intermediaries. It could be stated that
distributed ledger technology was able to emerge after some technological developments
and maturity of databases, networks, cryptography, e-commerce and others.
In order to use the blockchain ledger technology, users must have cryptocurrency wallets
to keep their private keys safe and execute transactions. The private key is the owner’s
identity similar to the personal signature in the distributed network. While sending coins,
the transaction record is signed by the private key to maintain validation of authenticity,
integrity and non-repudiation. The receiver uses his own private key to decrypt the mes-
sage which is encrypted by the sender with the receiver’s public key [14]. Cryptocurrency
wallets enable these operations and provide secure means for private keys.
1.1 Related Work
A large amount of research has been done on the blockchain technology since Nakamoto’s
publication [14]. In this section, we will list the previous studies related to our thesis.
Firstly, the books and their contents will be explained. Then we will list master’s and
doctoral theses related to our subject. Lastly, we will mention about other works, white-
papers and web site articles etc.
In a book titled "Blockchain Basics" published in 2017, the concepts of why the blockchain
is needed, how it works, limitations and usage areas are covered [15]. Tiana Laurence,
in her book published by John Wiley & Sons in 2017, covers different blockchain appli-
cations such as Bitcoin, Ethereum, Ripple, Factom and platforms such as Hyperledger,
Azure, Bluemix and their industry impacts in finance, real estate, insurance, govern-
ment and other industries [16]. Melanie Swan categorized the blockchain in her book
as "Blockchain 1.0: Currency, Blockchain 2.0: Contracts, Blockchain 3.0: Justice Appli-
cations and Blockchain 4.0: Efficiency and Coordination Applications". Blockchain 1.0
means applications related to cash and digital payment. Blockchain 2.0 is contracts which
is more extensive than cash transactions such as stocks, bonds, loans, smart contracts.
Blockchain 3.0 is the applications beyond these and covers usage in government, culture,
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health and science. Besides these, wallet services and personal crypto security are men-
tioned in different aspects [17]. "Mastering Blockchain" written by Imran Bashir could
be the most detailed book covering blockchain technology, cryptography, coins, alterna-
tive coin and blockchain solutions [18]. Another book describing blockchain technology
in details and guiding for developing new technology solutions is written by Bambara
et al.and includes technology, business and governance use cases with the examples of
different best practices [19]. Blockchain 101, one of the very few sources in Turkish,
contains a detailed description of the basic concepts, wallet functions, blockchain appli-
cation areas, platforms, application examples, challenges and risks as well as technical
details of the cryptography and the blockchain technology [20]. There is not much books
covering security of the blockchain technology. In his book, Vincenzo Morabito dedi-
cated a section to the security of blockchain systems and explained architecture, layers
and challenges [21]. Another book named "Bitcoin and Blockchain Security" written
by Ghassan Karame and Elli Androulaki mentions about payment security and privacy,
recent attacks, possible countermeasures, user privacy and security of the Bitcoin wallets
[22]. There are many more books written about the blockchain, Bitcoin and alternative
coins, programming and mining, but we focus on the underlying technology and security
analysis of the cryptocurrency wallets.
There are many dissertations published but since this is a new technology and financial
sector is more interested in the usability, the studies mostly focus on application devel-
opment. Researchers are generally concentrated in coins, contracts and other financial
application areas. There is a master’s thesis written by Karl Wüst containing informa-
tion on security of blockchain technologies. He has mentioned about some attacks and
vulnerabilities in Ethereum and Stellar [23]. Also in his article called "Do you need a
Blockchain" he inquires whether the use of blockchain is really necessary or not and
in which cases which blockchain types should be used [24]. In his master’s thesis and
article with the same name under "Trustzone-backed Bitcoin Wallet" Miraje Gentilal
proposes a secured Bitcoin wallet with TrustZone which is a technology developed to
increase security. This technology enables logical separation of secure and non-secure
environment with an extension of processors and system architectures. Proposed Bitcoin
wallet aimed to be more resilient against dictionary and side-channel attacks [2]. In [25],
Bitcoin security is examined through the transaction and production methods. Security
breaches are examined but the security is mostly discussed on hardware parts. Also,
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this work includes suggestions about safe usage methods of wallets. Similarly, Bamert et
al.also focused on hardware security and made a proposal of secure Bitcoin wallet named
BlueWallet [26]. As a hardware token, this device, which communicates on Bluetooth to
sign and authorize transactions, can be used with computers and smartphones and it is
also expected to be used with cash registers.
There are lots of articles discussing blockchain applications and coins. Due to the increas-
ing number of coin losses with attacks on wallets and the emergence of newly produced
wallets claiming security, researchers began to work more on the safety of wallets. In an
article about pervasiveness of blockchain, [27] mentions that data privacy problem has
not yet been solved and this problem depends on the private key. Another article named
"A Survey on Security and Privacy Issues of Bitcoin" discusses the challenges, risks and
security considerations thoroughly. In a section discussing client side security threats, it
is stated that wallet thefts are due to the use of system hacking, incorrect usage of wallet
and buggy software installation. Management and secure storage of user keys are main
points of relying on public cryptography on Bitcoin. There is also information about
wallet types. Popular wallets are specified in a table in the aspects of type, interface,
independence, underlying platform, privacy and security [28]. Low level communication
security of the Bitcoin wallets are discussed by Gkaniatsou et al.[29]. They claim that
their work is the first work stressing security issues of Bitcoin transactions in low level
communication. Although they work on Ledger hardware wallet, it is stated that their
security proposals could be adopted to all similar wallets easily. To analyze the commu-
nication protocol, they reverse-engineered the wallet implementation and found out that
setup protocol could be accessed by attackers by forcing re-initialization, the plain-text
PIN could be eavesdropped and all characters of the security card which is used for sec-
ond factor authentication could be learned. They propose a lightweight fix by offering
authentication protocol and sensitive data encryption. In a very recent article [30], hard-
ware wallets are defined in a formal framework. Instead of manual inspection of wallet
implementations, they aim to provide formal model of hardware wallets for verification
by conceptualizing them as a system with different modules.
The studies about the physical attacks against hardware wallets are also published.
Volotikin exposed the private key of second factor verification mechanism, proving that
Ledger’s flash memory is accessible [31]. In a presentation, Datko et al.explained how
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they could extract the private keys with fault injection techniques and side channel analy-
sis methods [32]. They used an open source tool to show the timing attack vulnerability
on the processor used in Trezor and KeepKey hardware wallets. Before these works,
known first physical attack to the Trezor hardware wallet was performed by Jochen
Hoenicke [33]. He achieved to recover the private key by simple power analysis which re-
quires less expensive tools and short time. His achievement provided developer to release
an update including required patches.
There are also reports prepared by institutions and government agencies. A report pre-
pared by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) provides high level
technical overview, detailed and useful information about the blockchain technology. It
includes not only advantages but also disadvantages, limitations and misconceptions.
Another point addressed in the report is that the blockchain technology has not been
immune yet and there is still cyber security risks. Wallets are mentioned in the discus-
sion of private key storage. It stated that there is a tendency to over-hype and overuse
of the blockchain technology as in most developing technologies [34]. Section 3 of the
report prepared by FINRA, a non-profit organization regulating broker-dealer opera-
tions, provides information on what to consider when creating a distributed ledger [35].
Briefly it declares that security should not only be thought as the only direct attacks
on the system but also environmental safety, policies, assumptions and suggestions for
usage should also be considered. Another report describing challenges for blockchain
implementations is prepared by the Secure Technology Alliance. Security considerations
section is the core part related to our thesis [36]. In "Blockchain and Cyber Security"
report, Deloitte’s experts discussed the security and maturity of blockchain in terms of
the confidentiality, integrity and availability. They also addressed the authentication,
authorization and non-repudiation specifications for new designs [37].
1.2 Contribution
Since blockchain technology is new and not yet immune as stated in [34], it may have
several vulnerabilities. While there is an over-hype and race about cryptocurrency prod-
ucts, it is inevitable that security evaluations and considerations could be ignored or stay
behind. Research and developments are mostly focused on analysis and formal abstrac-
tions about Bitcoin transactions and blockchain protocols as in [38], [39], [40], [41]. On
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the other side, although there are individual efforts to analyze security of hardware and
software wallets, currently no formal verification or any standardization of commercial
cryptocurrency wallets has been published.
The main contribution of this thesis is to provide useful information for developers and
users by examining the security weaknesses of wallets and fill the gaps of the formal
evaluation methodology. Presented information would be collected as a resource for
the PP documents used in CC, which is the most known international standard for
evaluating the security of information technology products. Due to the fact that CC
addresses product safety thoroughly and completely including environmental security,
our proposal is expected to be enough for a wallet to provide security against known
attacks.
In addition, the proposed hardware wallet in which we describe the design in our thesis
will help producing secure wallets for developers. Comparing it with other hardware
wallets we have shown that it is more reliable and secure.
1.3 Outline
This thesis consists of six chapters. In the first chapter, after the introduction section we
included a literature review on the security of blockchain technology and cryptocurrency
wallets. Then, we mentioned about the contribution of this thesis.
Chapter 2 gives information about blockchain and crypto wallets. Blockchain types,
principles and structure are mentioned in here. After describing types of wallets and
security considerations, we defined the assets of wallets to understand what needs to be
protected. Lastly, working mechanism of a Bitcoin wallet is described.
Chapter 3 is focused on CC standard. After we briefly explain what is CC evaluation
concept, evaluation levels, PP and ST documents, Functional and Assurance Require-
ments are described. We defined security problems of wallets in terms of threats, assump-
tions and organizational security policies. Also, this chapter includes security objectives
which are protection rules against attackers and covers security functional requirements
detailing security objectives defined in CC methodology.
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Chapter 4 contains our hardware wallet design. We have combined all the aspects of the
presented CC structure in this section and proposed a complete solution that provides
overall security.
In Chapter 5, security analysis of known hardware wallets detailed with known attacks
and prevention methods. Comparative analysis of hardware wallets is included to show
the distinction between our secure wallet design and others.
Chapter 6 summarizes and concludes the thesis.
Chapter 2
Blockchain and Wallets
Blockchain technology was first introduced by Satoshi Nakamoto, a pseudonym, in his
white paper named "Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System", proposed in 2008
and published on January 9, 2009. The technology and core idea behind the Bitcoin in
Nakamoto’s paper depends on the decentralized ledger and cryptographically validation
of transactions instead of central authority [14]. His paper can be considered as a great
innovative and revolutionary point in terms of related technology. In the meantime,
many books and articles have been published about the blockchain. Most of these studies
focused on financial systems and digital money. Besides this, blockchain could be used
in many more areas such as smart contracts, copyright protection, digital identity etc.
Decentralized type of ledger offers all participants to be able to view, monitor, log,
approve and validate the records of transactions in a real time basis [42]. In this chapter
we will give brief information about blockchain and wallets.
2.1 Types of Blockchain
The classification of blockchain technology can be done in different ways. In general, we
see the classification according to approval requirement for participation to the network
and read access to the blockchain ledger. Another method is approval requirement for
participation in the reconciliation structure and write access to the ledger. In [34], cate-
gorization is done according to the permission model determining who is able to publish
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a new block. They set the names as permissionless and permissioned networks. Permis-
sionless blockchain networks let anyone to be able to publish new blocks, permissioned
blockchain networks let only particular users publish new blocks. Also, permissioned
ones can be exemplified as intranet in a corporate and permissionless ones as public
internet which lets anyone to participate.
If all sides do not trust each other and there is a requirement for public verification, these
type of permissioned blockchains are called as public permissioned blockchains. If there
is a requirement for restriction of users, these type of blockchains are called as private
permissioned blockchains [24].
In [15], same classification is done according to read and write restrictions. Another clas-
sification is done by Hileman et al.who separate blockchain as closed and open blockchains
then separates open blockchain as public permissionless and public permissioned. Closed
blockchains are divided into consortium and private permissioned blockchains [43]. It is
obvious that same classification is defined with different names, public blockchain is
called as open and private blockchain is called as closed.
2.1.1 Permissionless Blockchain
Permissionless blockchains let anyone to join and leave the network any time and there is
no management or control for membership or unwanted entries. Some of the blockchain
applications require this type of transparency so that any peer can read contents and ver-
ify blocks. Bitcoin, Ethereum and Zerocash are examples of permissionless blockchains
[24]. Permissionless structure facilitates some functions of cryptocurrency wallets. Iden-
tification of wallet to the blockchain network is not required. Any wallet address could
be used to send and receive coins.
Public permissionless blockchain, providing read and write access to everyone like Bitcoin,
depends on less human contribution and more algorithmic security and data consistency
[44].
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2.1.2 Permissioned Blockchain
If there is requirement for permission to do any action on blockchain system, this type of
distributed ledgers are called as permissioned blockchain. In [43], there is a brief history
of the permissioned blockchain saying that the need of permissioned systems are required
due to the corporate needs. Using public infrastructures run by anonymous users and
unregulated structures caused some institutions to be uncomfortable. This need was met
with the adaptation of permissioned blockchains to the enterprise requirements.
Permissioned blockchain networks may restrict and allow reading and submitting trans-
actions. Consensus models could be used for publishing blocks without expense or main-
tenance requirements. There must be a level of trust for peers and if there is a misbehave,
the authorization can be revoked [34].
Verification requirement in this structure could be achieved by verifying cryptocurrency
wallet and corresponding owner. Handling every wallet and wallet address could be
burdensome. Unlike independent structure of blockchain logic, this structure is reliant
to the integrity of members or verification handlers.
There is an example of permissioned blockchain network called Open Blockchain origi-
nated by IBM. In this network there is a registration process for authorizing users and
processing transactions. The system contains membership management responsible for
identifying users, validating peers for transactions, non-validating peers for maintaining
network and end users [22].
For the comparison of permissionless and permissioned blockchains, table 2.1 could be
helpful to understand main differences in terms of read/write access, security, speed,
identity and asset.
Table 2.1: Open versus Permissioned Blockchains [11]
OPEN PERMISSIONED
Read/Write Open read/write access Permission read and/or write access
Security Compensate untrusted parties Identified, pre-approved participants
Speed Slower Faster
Identity Anonymous Known identities
Asset Native (e.g., Bitcoin, Ether) Any asset
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2.2 Principles of Blockchain
In [36], basic principles of blockchains are listed as the decentralization, trustlessness, con-
sensus network, transaction transparency, transaction immutability and pseudonymity.
These are listed as permissionless networks. Also there is another listing relatively short
but added "survivable" item to these features [11]. In another paper, the most relevant
properties of distributed ledgers are described and compared with centralized systems.
Public verifiability, transparency, privacy, integrity, redundancy and trust anchor are the
core elements of this paper [24].
Below is a combined list of blockchain principles.
Decentralization No central authority is required so that there is no single point of
failure and vulnerability.
Trustlessness Trust is not needed in blockchain applications; due to the permissionless
structure, everybody is allowed to enter and leave to the network.
Consensus Network For the validity of transaction, agreement over a decision is re-
quired, so there is a process and structure to do that.
Transaction transparency or Public verifiability In permissionless networks, all
transactions are open to everyone.
Transaction immutability A transaction or block cannot be changed, damaged or
deleted once it is added to the chain and validated.
Pseudonymous Transactions are done by anonymous nodes, nobody can see the iden-
tity of the peers.
Survivable Peers entering and leaving network does not harm the system or corrupt
any data.
2.3 Structure of Blockchain
In this section, we will explain how the blockchain network works with the help of
Bitcoin. In a typical blockchain network as seen in figure 2.1, there are participants who
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are making transactions and validating these transactions. Also, there is a shared and
distributed ledger to keep records of every transaction. User A sends coins to user B
with his wallet that prepares transaction including sender, receiver and amount. This
transaction is signed by user A to provide sender verifiability and non-repudiation. Every
transaction prepared by wallets is sent to Bitcoin network. In this peer-to-peer network,
blocks are established with the transactions to enable verification mechanism. A specific
Bitcoin proof of work mechanism is used to verify each block. Once a verification is
achieved, the block is broadcasted to all nodes. Receiver nodes verify each transaction
in the block and accept the block as a new one. Each new block is added to the end of
previous records and hash calculation is done to keep integrity. Recording the transaction
to the ledger means that the receiver (which is user B in our example) received the coins.
Figure 2.1: Structure of Bitcoin Blockchain Network
2.4 Cryptocurrency Wallets
Cryptocurrency wallets are required for the storage of addresses and public-private key
pairs used for receiving and sending money. Wallets provide monitoring balances by
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keeping track of transactions in the chain of blocks [45]. While some wallets are built for
a single currency, most of the wallets can deal with several cryptocurrencies.
Simply, a cryptocurrency wallet is a software or combination of software and hardware
using public-private key pairs. The design of the wallets may vary and users can choose
suitable one according to their needs.
Specification of the wallets can be listed as following:
• Wallets store one or more public-private key pairs.
• Wallets store one or more addresses generated from public keys.
• Coins are not stored in wallets. The balance could be obtained from transactions.
• There are recovery methods against possibility of corruption or loss of wallets.
• Wallets could be working online or oﬄine.
2.4.1 Types of Wallets
Hot and Cold Wallets: Primarily, we can divide wallets as hot and cold wallets. Hot
wallets work always or mostly online and transactions can be executed at any time.
Online (Cloud) wallets, desktop and mobile wallets could be specified in this type. On
the other hand, cold wallets work oﬄine and aim is to protect against attacks over the
internet. Since network attacks are applicable mostly on hot wallets, they have wider
attack surface. Cold wallets, generally refers to paper and hardware wallets are exposed
to other types of attacks and it is questionable which type of wallet is safer. Stealing
and losing are main security concerns of cold wallets [28].
Deterministic and Non-Deterministic Wallets: If the categorization is done ac-
cording to the key generation methods, wallets are categorized into deterministic and
non-deterministic [46]. Deterministic wallets are generating all keys from a seed which
is called as single key or root key. There are mechanisms to generate each key pair from
the seed. Seed is generated from a mnemonic sentence in case of failure or loss [47]. A
mnemonic can bring all addresses and private keys while providing security. Since 512-
bit keys are created from the seed, they can provide unpredictability in 2512 possibility.
Non-deterministic wallet generates random and independent keys which requires backing
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up all keys and storing [46]. Deterministic wallets are divided into three categories as
deterministic, hierarchical deterministic and armory deterministic wallets according to
their different security levels [48].
Another type of wallet classification is done according to satisfying user requirements and
processing environment. Wallet types in this classification are called as paper, mobile,
desktop, online and hardware.
Paper Wallets: Paper wallets are not used on their own. They are part of any other
wallet application to keep addresses and keys safe physically. On paper wallets there are
two QR codes; one is for encoding user’s address to receive coins and other one is for
encoding user’s secret key to spend coins [22]. Transferring coins between hot wallets and
paper wallet can be done when needed regardless of time. This process called sweeping
and it could be done by scanning QR codes or entering private keys manually. One of
the well-known examples of paper wallets is in figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2: MyEtherWallet Paper Wallet [1].
Mobile Wallets: While everything was going towards mobilization, it was inevitable
for crypto wallets to be mobile. Providing accessibility, convenience and storing private
keys locally; mobile wallets let owners to use them almost anywhere and anytime. Mobile
wallets consist of applications running on mobile devices. They use another advantage
of being hot wallet which is verifying transaction validity without downloading entire
blockchain system [22]. Breadwallet, Coinomi, Mycelium, Toastwallet and Freewallet
are some examples in this type.
Desktop Wallets: Running on PC or laptops, accessibility of desktop wallets is limited
to the installed computer only. On the other hand, they offer a lot of features and services.
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Figure 2.3: Crypto Wallet Brands Taxonomy.
Resource use and software capacity are higher than other wallet types. Aside from
network attacks and virus threats, desktop wallets provide considerable security level
[22]. Most used examples of this type are Multibit, Electrum, Armory, and Bitcoin/QT.
Online Wallets: Online wallets, also called as cloud wallets are web based wallets
working on cloud systems. Keeping private keys in the cloud system makes them most
remarkable target for attackers and prone to attacks. The most important features
that distinguishes online wallets from others are that availability and accessibility con-
veniences [22]. In addition to the distributed structure of the blockchain, online wallets
require trusting someone else; cloud providers. Coinbase, CoinKite, GreenAddress and
SpectroCoin are some examples of online wallets.
Hardware Wallets: These are physical cryptocurrency wallets dedicated to securely
store private keys and addresses. Oﬄine storage of the sensitive keys makes these wallets
more secure than other types. Online attacks are only expected during a transaction when
a user connects hardware wallet to a computer . Besides this, this wallet type prone to
specific hardware attacks and vulnerabilities. To prevent any attack, hardware devices
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can be tested and certified according to some standards. The only condition for the
security measures to be taken is that people should not lose their wallets [22]. Hardware
failure is another issue about these wallets. This drawback, if there is no recovery policy
or back up, can cause dramatic loss. For these reasons, corresponding precautions and
security requirements are included in these devices. Keepkey, Ledger, Trezor and BitBox
are the most known crypto wallets currently.
2.4.2 Security of Wallets
The main purpose of the wallets is to provide safe storage environment for private-public
keys. The security functions of different wallets are based on the characteristics that are
shaped according to the user needs and threats. Hardware wallets’ security requirements
are very different than other types of wallets. They are susceptible to hardware failures
and theft besides hardware attacks. Software wallets are mostly prone to software failures
and network attacks.
Security functionality of all type of wallets are mostly focused on keeping assets safe and
providing secure authentication mechanisms. Proper methods for keeping assets during
use or in storage are crucial. User authentication, password or PIN complexity and right
implementation are also another essence parts of the security [49].
As in any other product, the security of the device alone is not enough and a holistic
approach should be applied. For this reason, CCMethodology is applied to define security
objectives for wallets which are called as Target of Evaluation(TOE) in CC and their
operational environment.
About the authentication mechanisms, there are different ways enhancing security. Some
wallets are using multi-signature (also called as multi-sig) authorization means requiring
more than one key to authorize a transaction. Main purposes of multi-signature methods
are establishing more security to prevent human error and creating democratic way to
be used by one or more people. With this method, difficulty of the attacks are increased
and probability of the coin loss is decreased [22]. We have seen examples that if any such
measures were implemented before the attack, there would be no loss. The attack of
Bitfinex which resulted in $65 million and Parity’s loss of $30 million might be prevented
[50].
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2.4.3 Cryptocurrency Wallet Assets
In order to understand the security requirements, assets that need to be protected should
be better explained. Contrary to the first thought that comes to mind, coins are not kept
in cryptocurrency wallets, instead, blockchain ledgers keep records of coin transactions
and this records prove the ownership of all coins. Assets of a cryptocurrency wallet can
be briefly defined as protected objects, operations, security attributes and authorization
data [4]. They are described in detail below.
Seed: A seed is used to generate key pairs. Since deterministic wallets use seed as a
generator and chain of key pairs start from seed, this is the most important part of the
assets. In case of a failure or loss, the recovery could be done by seed. On the other
side, If this seed gets in the hands of the attackers or malicious people, the owner of
the wallet loses all coins. In most of the wallets, seed is converted into mnemonic which
is long sequenced word string created for users to remember easily. Human interaction
with words or sentences are superior compared to the numerical representation of a seed
[51].
Private Keys: Private keys are generated from seed in deterministic wallets by using
a specific algorithm. Traditional wallets generate private keys randomly when needed.
These keys are required to spend coins. During a transaction, wallet owner use a private
key to sign it as a confirmation. This is also an important asset of a wallet. There could
be a lot of private keys in a wallet and compromise of any key causes loss of corresponding
coins.
Cryptographic Operations: Another asset to be protected in a wallet is the cryp-
tographic operation used for exchange of coins. If there is a fault during hashing or
asymmetric cryptography, an unexpected result could be obtained.
Security Functionality: Self-protection, secure initialization and non-bypassability re-
quirements in a wallet are provided by security functionalities such as tamper resistance,
tamper response mechanisms, obfuscation and software countermeasures. These are im-
portant specifications that need to work properly during the life-cycle of any wallet.
User Data:The authentication data of the owner is another asset in a wallet. Whether
the password or PIN is in hash form or not, it should not be captured by attackers.
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2.4.4 Cryptocurrency Wallet Working Mechanism
In this section, sending Bitcoin, transaction steps in a wallet and cryptocurrency network
will be described. Receiving Bitcoin does not require any action from receiving party
other than sharing public key.
Lets assume that Alice has converted her money to the Bitcoin and she has it in her
wallet. She wants to send some Bitcoin to her friend Bob.
Figure 2.4: Transaction steps [2].
• First of all, Alice needs to log in to her cryptocurrency wallet. If it is a hardware
wallet, after connecting it to a computer or mobile device she will log in on user
interface. If she use desktop or mobile wallet, she just run the wallet application.
In case of an online wallet, logging in is done on web interface. Authentication
process must be secured by wallet and environment as stated in chapter 6.
• If there are more than one account in her wallet she chooses the account that she
wants to use.
• She enters the amount of coin to send.
• Entering Bob’s public address is also required. Public key enables Bob to receive
Bitcoin and claim ownership. In this step, Alice is suggested to double check Bob’s
address against related attacks described in chapter 5.
• After filling every information, Alice transfers the coins to Bob. In this step, Alice’s
private key signs the transaction record which is prepared by wallet. Signing with
private key provides Bob to verify the sender with the corresponding public key.
Signing must be done in secure environment.
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• When Alice submits the payment, the transaction is broadcasted to the Bitcoin
network for verification process.
• This transaction record is included in a chain block together with other records.
In Bitcoin network, transactions are bundled every ten minutes and miner nodes
in the network verify the block with a special method.
• Miners calculate hash values according to a rule. When a miner achieves to cal-
culate the required hash value, he earns Bitcoin prize and the transactions in the
block are verified.
Chapter 3
Common Criteria
CC is developed in order to determine the security levels of information technology
products and/or systems and to test them in independent laboratories. It is adopted by
the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) as the International Criteria
for Information Technology Security Evaluation Standard in 1999 (ISO 15408) [52]. CC
combined and replaced European, US and Canadian criteria which are ITSEC, TCSEC
and CTCPEC respectively. The importance and power of the CC comes from large
involvement of experienced parties. The intention is to provide flexible and standardized
security criteria, provide global recognition and acceptance. Once a product is evaluated
and certified by a Certificate Authorizing Country, the certification is recognized by other
countries. If the product will be sold in the international market, re-evaluation would
not be required by each purchasing country [53].
Evaluation of IT products lets consumers to understand fulfillment of security features.
At the time this thesis was written, there are 30 countries as Certificate Authorizing
or Certificate Consuming participants and once a product is evaluated in one of these
countries up to a certain level, the certification is accepted by all.
3.1 Common Criteria Definitions
Currently, the latest version of CC standard consists of three parts. CC Part 1 introduces
general concepts and gives information about security evaluation. As an introduction
and overview of the CC standard, this part includes description of other parts of the
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standard, terms and abbreviations, general model, PP and ST specifications. Also,
there is guidance for developers and evaluators about how to use the standard. Part 2
includes detailed definition of security functional requirements. Most common security
requirements of IT products are listed in this part. These well defined requirements can
be used by developers to establish trusted products. If requirements in this book do
not meet the needs of developers, they are allowed to make own extended definitions by
adhering to the general model. In Chapter 6 of Part 2, TOE, the subject of the evaluation,
is defined as a set of software, firmware and/or hardware with the guidance documents
[54]. A TOE might be any IT product of which assets or operations requiring security.
Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) are pre-defined rules to control information and
services in a TOE. CC Evaluation focuses on ensuring these rules are fully and correctly
applied. In Part 3 of the CC Standard, there is Security Assurance Requirements(SARs).
These are the measures defined in ST or PP to provide compliance with the claimed
security functionality for each TOE.
3.1.1 Evaluation Assurance Levels
CC defines seven evaluation levels from EAL1 to EAL7 representing assurance packages
which called as Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs). These levels define how deep an
evaluator will examine the TOE and related documents. The developer documentation
must be detailed according to the evaluation level requirements. Depending on the
assurance level, the deliverables include functional specifications, design specification,
source code and guidance documents etc. [55]. As the level of evaluation increases, the
examination detail also increases. Each level has a package of assurance requirements
providing a strict level of detail and security. ST or PP writers choose a level and extend
it with assurance components in case of an additional requirement. For example, a
developer can choose EAL4 level with an additional component which provides higher
vulnerability analysis detail [56].
EAL1 includes evaluation of functional and interface specifications of TOE and it pro-
vides security functions’ analysis. Analysis is followed by independent testing of security
behaviors of TOE.
EAL2 is the structurally testing level which provides analysis of TOE functions. High-
level design of TOE subsystems are tested by using functional and interface specifications.
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EAL3 requires more developer interaction and provides higher assurance for more seri-
ous threats. There is also requirement of configuration management and environmental
control during development process.
EAL4 provides analysis of low-level design of TOE modules. Before testing, evaluators
need to search up-to-date vulnerabilities independently. Development process controls
are also supported by checking of life-cycle model, development tools identification and
automated configuration management.
In an EAL5 evaluation, analysis of code implementation and semi-formal presentation
of design is included. It is expected from the developer to provide modular and semi-
formal design. Vulnerability analysis and calculation of attack potential require more
robust production.
EAL6 evaluation focuses on modular and layered analysis of semi-formally described
design and source code implementation. Vulnerability analysis is performed at high
resistance level and rigorous development environment is required.
Figure 3.1: CC Evaluation Assurance Levels.
As the highest level of evaluation, EAL7 means formal presentation of functional specifi-
cation and most detailed investigation of evidences. White box testing and independent
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confirmation of developer test results must be done by evaluators. Due to the high
risk situation and specialized security requirements, complexity of the product must be
minimized.
Assurance through the evaluation is provided by analysis and checking of processes,
procedures, correspondences between TOE parts, TOE design representation, guidance
documents, functional tests, independent tests and potential vulnerabilities [56].
Other than these three part which constitute the CC standard, there is another ISO
standard named Common Evaluation Methodology. This standard explains evaluation
steps for evaluators and documentation context for developers.
In the CC evaluation process, stakeholders are evaluators, developers, sponsors and cer-
tificate authorities. Evaluators perform evaluation activities according to standards by
examining documents, testing and analyzing TOE etc. [57]. First of all, the vendor pre-
pares ST document describing security problems of the product, security objectives and
security functional requirements. These requirements could be taken from PPs. Follow-
ing the ST, vendor produces and prepares TOE and related documents for evaluation. If
there is a sponsor, he is responsible for supporting the evaluation. Certificate authority
is the main controller of the whole process, decision-maker and observer. Every report
and test is controlled by the evaluation authority and based on the evaluation results au-
thority issues certificates [58]. Evaluators’ work is basically checking compatibility of the
evaluation evidences which comprises TOE development, guidance, life-cycle definition
and configuration management documentations, then testing the product functionally
and finally doing vulnerability analysis [3].
3.1.2 Protection Profile
PP is prepared to address implementation-independent security requirements of a prod-
uct type. It contains statement of security problem, functional and assurance require-
ments. The sections in this document must contain introduction, conformance claim,
security problem definition, security objectives, extended component definition and se-
curity requirements.
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In the introduction section, there is information about TOE type. Identification and
abstract is given in the first part. Conformance claim section contains whether this PP
claims conformance to any other PPs and/or packages.
Security problem definition section shows threats, organizational security policies(OSPs)
and assumptions while security objectives section has solutions of security problems.
Security objectives intent to counter security problems with TOE objectives and com-
ply policies with environmental or TOE objectives. The trace between problems and
objectives must be established completely and correctly. If there is any extended compo-
nent they are included in extended component definition section. Extended means any
components which are not included in CC standard.
Lastly there must be a section of security functional and assurance requirements which
are translated versions of security objectives in specialized language of CC [59].
Security requirements can be determined by product or system purchasers in the PP
documents and they can request vendors to claim conformance to a PP and satisfy
defined requirements in the ST of the product [55].
3.1.3 Security Target
ST document identifies the security properties of a TOE. It is unique for each product.
ST documents could be referenced to a related PP or developers can define security
properties on their own.
The content of an ST document is similar to the PP. Instead of a product group, ev-
ery specification is documented by considering a single TOE. Briefly, it includes secu-
rity functional requirements and corresponding security objectives, security assurance
requirements and evaluation scope [57].
In figure 3.2 the development process of Security Target document is described.
3.1.4 Security Functional Requirements
Security Functional Requirements specify detailed security rules for TOE functions to
access and use of its resources. They are pre-defined definitions in the second part of
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Figure 3.2: The CC-compliant IT security development process as a UML activity
diagram [3].
CC standard. SFRs are grouped according to the specifications such as security audit,
communication, cryptographic support, user data protection and security management.
If a developer wants to define a specification about cryptographic operation, he can
choose corresponding SFRs from the cryptographic support section.
CC allows developers to tailor SFRs through the use of permitted operations. The
tailoring could be done by iteration, assignment, selection or refinement. Iteration allows
developers to use the same SFR more than once for different operations. If an SFR
has parameter setting field, assignment operation allows assigning the specification of
parameters. Selection operation is used in multiple choice fields in the SFRs, developers
can choose one or more items from the pre-defined list. If there is need of information
addition or change for a detail in an SFR, refinement operation could be used.
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3.1.5 Security Assurance Requirements
The measures that must be taken during the development and evaluation of a TOE de-
fined by SARs. They provide assurance of compliance with the claimed security function-
ality. These components are used to determine what will be included in the evaluation.
The assurance requirements for particular TOEs are documented in the ST generally as
an EAL package and augmented components. SARs are defined in the third part of CC
standard. Although almost all requirements are defined, additional requirements can be
added by developers if required [56].
3.2 Security Problem Definition
Before going into problem definition, it is necessary to understand the assets within the
TOE. In this way, the problem definition will be better understood because assets are
the values that need to be protected in a product.
The assets of a cryptocurrency wallet were listed in chapter 2 as seed, private keys, cryp-
tographic operations, security functionality and user data. Security problem is caused
by the protection of these important assets. User data is used to identify the correct
user of the system. Depending on the developers, PIN, password or multiple mechanisms
could be used to authenticate the user. Protection of private keys used for signing in
cryptocurrency transactions is also important. Since correct operation of wallets and
security attributes provide proper and trusted work, they are accepted as assets. It is
necessary to take precautions against such situations because it will cause suspicion in
the security of the TOE.
Security Problem Definition section in a PP or ST includes the statement of security
problems to be solved by the TOE and TOE environment. Threats, Assumptions and
Organizational Security Policies are addressed in this section. Abbreviations at the
beginning of the following definitions which are T, A and P denote Threats, Assumptions
and Policies respectively. We have used CC standard and guidance documents to create
these definitions.
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3.2.1 Threats
In CC, threats are defined in terms of threat agent, adverse action/attack method and
asset which is subject of the attack [4]. Threats are potential security vulnerabilities that
have been created by considering the assets and interfaces. Situations that may disrupt
the operation of the product and disable the security services are also considered as
threat. Possible threats of cryptocurrency wallets defined according to CC terminology
are as follows:
T.Compromise: The data in the protected area may be compromised by an attacker
applying unauthorized actions [60]. This attack could be performed in different ways
according to all wallet types.
T.UnauthorizedAccess: An attacker may perform adverse actions to bypass authen-
tication mechanisms of seized, lost or stolen wallet. Attacker may gain root access of
a wallet by bypassing PIN or fingerprint lock [49]. For biometric authentication, fake
finger or several other ways could be used to fool fingerprint sensors. Cloud wallets are
also vulnerable to these kind of attacks. This attack is different than the direct attacks
such as brute force, dictionary etc. against authentication mechanisms.
T.ReverseEngineering: An attacker may obtain internal software design by reverse
engineering to extract potential vulnerabilities. Vulnerabilities could be about hard-
coded passwords, application specific information, security services and encryption keys
[49].
T.FakeAddress: An attacker may alter the receiving and sending address to get coins
into his own wallet. In such an attack, a trojan monitors the system always and it can
change the sending address to the attackers address during the process of sending money
[61]. For the receiving address, it can be replaced during the sharing of receiving address
with a sender.
T.WeakAuthentication: An attacker may use related attacks to break the authentica-
tion mechanisms. These attacks could be brute force, dictionary, guessing user password,
passphrase or PIN [49]. To enable this attack, hardware wallets need to be connected
to a network or it must be seized by attackers, otherwise oﬄine wallets are not target of
this threat.
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T.Eavesdropping: An attacker may monitor and listen the communication between
application interface and wallets. This attack could be used to get authentication data
or to get private keys if they are exchanged and used outside of secure area [49]. For
hardware wallets, this attack is valid only when the wallet is used and connected to the
online network.
T.DDoS: An attacker may use tools and/or botnet for online wallets to cause denial of
service [62]. This attack degrades the quality of a connection or fully breaks it. The main
intention of this attack is to make wallet services unable to be used. To execute this kind
of attacks, attackers need to find a bug or weakness in the software implementation [63].
As stated in [64], this type of attacks can cause dramatic falls in coin prices. Even as
in the previous examples some transactions sent for confirmation are blocked and some
exchanges stopped the trade.
T.UnauthorizedUpdate: An attacker may try to update the TOE with malicious
software and/or firmware in order to bypass security features and obtain sensitive data
[65].
T.InformationLeakage: An attacker may perform non-invasive attacks which are also
called as side channel attacks to obtain useful information. Useful data could leak during
the cryptographic operations and attackers could extract private keys by analyzing leaked
data. Power consumption of crypto processor, , timing information, electromagnetic
emanation and input/output characteristics are the main sources of leakages [66] .
T.Hardware: An attacker may try to modify hardware parts of the wallets and get sen-
sitive information or cause availability and authenticity compromise. Performing phys-
ical probing of the hardware parts and disclosing security functionality, authentication
information and private keys are in this type of attack [67].
T.Malfunction: An Attacker may apply environmental stress to hardware wallets and
cause malfunction in order to modify, deactivate or affect security services. Applying
environmental stress means power, clock or electromagnetic glitches. The expectation
of this attack is corruption in random numbers, security checks and control mechanisms
and enable other attacks disclosing user data or manipulating software [67]. Before
exploiting this attack, information about operational functionality or internal design
must be obtained.
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T.Reflashing: An attacker may install malicious firmware on hardware wallets to gain
control over device [68]. Hardware based vulnerabilities could be used to reach and access
firmware level of TOE.
T.Replacing: An attacker may replace a hardware wallet with a fake one to get access
by obtaining authentication data. In this attack, attacker try to get owner’s data by
placing wireless transmitter or keylogger into the fake wallet [68]. Although replacing
is not a direct attack to the wallet data, there could be mechanisms to overcome this
attack in the wallets.
3.2.2 Assumptions
Assumptions are expectations from the TOE operational environment in terms of secu-
rity aspects. Operational environment of a TOE could be users, hardware or software
platforms, operating systems, other applications and physical locations. Meeting the
expectations about environment strengthens secure functionality of the TOE. Threats
are defined in normal operating conditions of the environment.
Since evaluation of environmental factors are beyond CC scope and CC is only suitable
for IT systems assessment, assumptions cannot be tested during the evaluation process
and directed to the operational environment.
A.SecurePlatform: All types of cryptocurrency wallets are assumed to be in a secure
environment. It is expected that wallet platforms are working properly and securely.
For each type of cryptocurrency wallets, the corresponding environmental components
need to take necessary precautions. Untrusted applications come from unverified servers,
malware, backdoor and rootkit installations are the main attacks that are expected to
be prevented [49].
A.EducatedTrustedUsers: Authorized users are assumed to know recent cyber at-
tacks and follow all procedures in user guidance not to expose any sensitive data. Also,
users are expected to keep PIN, password and passphrases safe, check correctness of ad-
dresses and amount while sending coin, be careful about shoulder surfing. Recent cyber
attacks include social engineering and phishing attacks [68].
A.SearchPoison: Search engines are assumed to take necessary precautions not to let
poisoned search results which are redirecting users to the fake addresses. As stated in
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the A.EducatedTrustedUsers assumption, users are assumed to be aware of this kind of
fake address or phishing advertisement attacks and behave with caution. Since poisoning
search result is not a direct attack to the wallet and there is no security objective for this
situation, mitigation must be done by users. If users are redirected to the fake address,
attackers can get their private information and drain wallets [69].
A.Update: Recovery and update assumed to be done in secure state and will not
disrupt proper functionality of cryptocurrency wallets. During the update operation,
any software other that newer version of wallet environment components should not be
installed.
Table 3.1: Matching Threats, Assumptions and Organizational Security Poli-
cies(OSPs) with wallet types.
Threats/Assumptions/OSPs Hardware Mobile Desktop Cloud
T.Compromise X X X X
T.UnauthorizedAccess X X X X
T.ReverseEngineering X X X
T.UnauthorizedUpdate X X X X
T.FakeAddress X X X X
T.WeakAuthentication X X X X
T.Eavesdropping X X X X
T.DDoS X X X
T.InformationLeakage X
T.Hardware X
T.Malfunction X
T.Reflashing X
T.Replacing X
A.SecurePlatform X
A.EducatedTrustedUsers X X X X
A.SearchPoison X X X
A.Update X X X X
P.StrongAuth X X X X
P.BackUp X
3.2.3 Organizational Security Policies
Rules defined by an organization, authority or developer for a TOE to provide func-
tionality and protect sensitive data are called as OSPs. These policies are expected to
be enforced by TOE and its operational environment [57]. Specifications of mandatory
security functions help mitigation of attacks and improve overall safety level.
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P.StrongAuth: Robust and complex PINs, passwords and passphrases will be used to
ensure a sufficient level of security. Authentication requirements defined by developer or
customer should be stated in the operational user guidance document.
P.BackUp: In case of a possible failure, hardware wallets will be designed to have secure
back up mechanism and provide recovery to maintain functionality and security.
3.3 Security Objectives
In order to provide a complete protection, security objectives are defined against security
problems. These objectives split into two parts which are security objectives for TOE
and security objectives for operational environment. In [57], security objectives are
defined as "statement of an intent to counter identified threats and/or satisfy identified
organization security policies and/or assumptions". Each security problem is addressed
by at least one security objective. Since assumptions are defined for environment, they
are only covered by security objectives for operational environment.
Security objectives for the TOE are assessed during the evaluation and further detailed
in Security Functional Requirements(SFRs) section in ST documents. With the help of
security objectives for operational environment which is providing correctness of envi-
ronment, security objectives for the TOE counters threats.
Figure 3.3: Role of the Security Objectives [4].
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3.3.1 Security Objectives for TOE
OT.Access: A certain level of authorization mechanism and complexity is provided
by security functionality of cryptocurrency wallets not to let attackers bypass these
mechanisms and gain unauthorized access to the assets [67]. Two-factor or multi-factor
authentication might be applied with a password, PIN or biometric data verification.
OT.ReverseEngineering: TOE security functionality provides protection against re-
verse engineering and does not let anyone obtain innate design to exploit possible vul-
nerabilities.
OT.FakeAddress: To prevent fake address attacks, cryptocurrency wallets operate
protection mechanisms such as controlling and disabling system or clipboard monitor-
ing.During the communication with the client, hardware wallets display the address on
screen for verification. The user can compare sending or receiving address displayed on
the computer screen and on the hardware wallet and then verify the transaction.
OT.Reflashing: Hardware wallets have protective and tamper resistant enclosure not
allowing attackers install any firmware [67].
OT.Replacing: In case of replacing with a fake and malicious one, hardware wallets are
designed in a way that is easily recognized by the owners. A unique message or figure
could be displayed on the screen before authentication so that the user understands
whether it belongs to him.
OT.WeakAuthentication: Wallets have security functionalities against authentica-
tion attacks and robustness against dictionary, brute force and guessing attacks. Long
and complex passwords, passphrases and PINs, monitoring unsuccessful login attempts,
CAPTCHA, enforcing retry time, delay and lock, are the main techniques of this objec-
tive [45].
OT.Eavesdropping: Communication between a hardware wallet and client software,
an online wallet and user’s computer, a mobile wallet and mobile platform or any other
communication channel with sensitive information are subject to the eavesdropping at-
tacks. Wallet security functionality provides obfuscated and encrypted communication
against these type of attacks. Minimizing sensitive information outside the secure area
is the most useful countermeasure in this regard [67].
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OT.Storage: Data storage is protected in a secure way not to let attackers gain useful
information in case of a compromise and leakage. Encryption of sensitive memory parts
and address mixing provide adequate protection even if memory is dumped and data is
captured.
OT.InformationLeakage: Hardware wallets are secured against information leakages
arising from any kind of emanation. Sensitive data cannot be obtained directly or indi-
rectly from the TOE [67].
OT.Hardware: Against hardware attacks, security mechanisms are implemented in
hardware wallets to detect and block physical attempts. Tamper protections which are
tamper evidence, tamper resistance and tamper response mechanisms prevent disclosing
sensitive information and maintaining secure functionality [67]. Tamper evidence detects
unauthorized intervention and ensures that the user takes the necessary action. Tamper
resistance makes unauthorized attempts difficult or even impossible by applying suitable
protection. Hardened cases and enclosures are examples for tamper resistance mecha-
nism. Tamper response mechanisms are used to counter physical attacks via shielding
or deleting sensitive data against disclosure. Tamper response includes detection and
destroy the necessary parts.
OT.Malfunction: Hardware wallets are resistant against fault attacks caused by unex-
pected conditions. Fault attacks are implemented by physical sources like power, clock,
electromagnetic glitches or laser and light beams. These invasive or non-invasive tech-
niques aim to put the TOE in error state by fluctuations [70]. Necessary precautions
(hardware sensors, secure software design etc.) should be taken since the inability to
detect these attacks will affect the safety of the products [67].
OT.Audit: Audit trails are recorded to provide detection and prove evidence of hard-
ware and software breaches. Keeping records play crucial role to understand failure,
service discontinuity or unauthorized attempts.
OT.KeyCompromise: The design of a wallet is done in a way that keeps sensitive
data in the secure area. Private key operations (signing a transaction) are done inside
the wallet and there is no option to send or store these keys outside of the wallet.
OT.FailSecure: In case of a failure caused by any situation, wallets enter failure mode
to maintain secure state. This is also called as fail-safe. When failure mode is securely
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implemented, no attacker can bypass security mechanisms and obtain any information.
This objective is very similar to tamper response mechanism in hardware attacks [60].
OT.Integrity: Wallets’ security functionality has integrity check mechanism [60]. Dur-
ing a transaction, integrity check provides the correctness and uniformity of transaction
information.
3.3.2 Security Objectives for Operational Environment
OE.DataImport: Data generation and transfer from outside to cryptocurrency wallets
should be done with secure channels.
OE.Platform: Cryptocurrency wallets should run on reliable platforms. For this reason,
the design and operation of the platforms should be organized in a secure manner against
misuse, untrusted application, rootkit, malware or backdoor installation.
OE.Users: Wallet users are trusted and educated about how to handle well-known
cyber security attacks and social engineering techniques [68].
OE.Components: Operational environment of a wallet is designed in a secure man-
ner. Information leakage or faulty operation caused by underlying components are not
expected [50].
OE.StrongAuth: Authentication mechanisms are used in a way that provides maxi-
mum security. PINs, passwords and passphrases are chosen at complex and unpredictable
level. Repeated or sequenced numbers, simple letters or words must be avoided, random,
robust and complicated but easy to remember passwords should be used [50].
OE.SafeSeed: In the event of a possible failure, the recovery seed or passphrases that
restore the wallet must be kept secure. If the recovery seed or passphrase is captured by
a malicious user, the wallet can be recovered and coins will be stolen easily [71].
OE.FakeAddress: Wallet users must be aware of forged search engine result attack
and check the link and page before entering the authentication credentials.
OE.Update: Recovery and update of any environmental components are done in a way
preserving secure state and normal working conditions. No environmental vulnerability
are expected after the update resulting from this process.
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Figure 3.4: Proposed Protection Mechanisms of Hardware Wallets
The mapping between threat, assumption and OSPs are shown in Table 3.2. According
to the CC, each threat is countered by at least one security objective for TOE while each
assumption is uphold by at least one environmental security objective. Assumptions
could only covered by environment. OSPs are enforced by at least one security objective.
Table 3.2: Matching Threats, Assumptions and Organizational Security Poli-
cies(OSPs) with Security Objectives.
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T.Compromise X X X X X X
T.UnauthorizedAccess X X X X X
T.ReverseEngineering X X X X X
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T.Reflashing X X X
T.Replacing X X
T.FakeAddress X X X X X X X
T.WeakAuthentication X X X X
T.Eavesdropping X X X X X X X
T.DDoS X X X X X X
T.InformationLeakage X X
T.Hardware X X X X
T.Malfunction X X X X
T.UnauthorizedUpdate X X X X
A.SecurePlatform X
A.EducatedTrustedUsers X
A.SearchPoison X X
A.Update X
P.StrongAuth X X X
P.BackUp X
3.4 Security Functional Requirements
Security Functional Requirements point out that how the security objectives are imple-
mented in CC Methodology. SFRs in CC Part 2 are known and agreed criteria to create
trusted products by defining the rules of access and use of TOE resources. Not all of the
security requirements are covered in the CC and defined rules are not a definitive answer
to all problems of TOE. Additional security requirements could be defined abide by the
methodology [54].
Security Objectives will be covered in this section. Raw SFRs taken from [54] will be
filled with necessary comments and additional information suitable for cryptocurrency
wallets. There are many classes that cover different needs such as audit, communication,
data protection and we will take the classes that match our needs and define the rest as
extended.
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Functional requirements are expressed in specific CC terminology; classes, families and
components. Class section is used for unique identification and categorization with three
characters. All functional requirements starts with the letter F indicating the functional
Requirement. Other two letters are showing the class type. For the communication class
the abbreviation of FCO is used. The same method is used as in family naming. Short
name of a family is indicated in three characters. For the cryptographic support class
and key management family, the naming is used as FCS_CKM. Functional class/fami-
ly/component/element hierarchy is shown in the following tree:
Class (FCO)
Family (FCS_CKM)
...
Family
Component (FCS_CKM.1)
...
Component
Element (FCS_CKM.1.1)
...
Element
3.4.1
Security Functional Requirements
SFRs are given as the same order in CC Part 2. Hierarchies and dependencies of SFRs
are not added in this thesis, they are defined in [54]. If an SFR is hierarchical to
another, it means that it provides more security functionality than the other. When an
SFR is not sufficient or when it requires additional SFR for functionality, dependency
arises. For example, cryptographic operation requirement needs generation or import of
cryptographic keys.
3.4.1.1 Security Audit Class (FAU)
The abbreviation of FAU comes from combination of Functional Requirements and Audit
Class. This class defines rules about auditing records.
FAU_ARP.1 Security alarms
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According to this SFR, the TOE shall take required actions if a potential security vul-
nerability is detected. PP/ST author should define the actions to be taken according to
the TOE type.
Considering crypto wallets for the SFR definition given in CC part 2 [54], these actions
could be any warning messages, led flashing, sound or vibrating alarms to inform the
owner to disable subject or functionality related to the potential vulnerability.
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
This SFR defines auditable event requirements and information details in records for any
incident audit records should be generated. Also, PP/ST author could define auditable
events and detail level of records.
In an audit record, at least date, time and type of event, subject and event result must
be included [54].
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_SAR consists of two elements, one of these is used to determine by whom the audit
records can be read. Second element states that the audit records must be suitable for
user interpretation. Since we do not assume a user group and profile in a cryptocurrency
wallet, service or maintenance user might read audit records. A wallet is dedicated to
and owned by an individual user. Before any action, authentication is required but a
limited channel could be provided for the service, maintenance or forensic reasons to the
service or maintenance user roles.
FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review
Audit restriction is defined in this SFR component. Access to the audit records is
prevented, except those allowed. If a developer wants to restrict read access of records
for some users, this SFR must be added to the ST.
FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
Requirement of protection from deletion of audit records in audit trail is defined in the
first element of this SFR. According to this SFR, wallets are designed to have security
mechanism for prevention or detection of unauthorized modifications to the audit records.
Protection of audit trail is very important for cloud wallets to understand if a security
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breach happens.
3.4.1.2 Communication Class (FCO)
Identity of the originator and identity of the recipient of information transmitted in
a data exchange, in other words proof of origin and proof of receipt mechanisms are
assured in this class with two following families. Non-repudiation is provided by these
components for both sender and receiver.
FCO_NRO.2 Enforced proof of origin
This SFR requires that evidence must be generated to maintain proof of origin for the
user defined information. Also, requirement of association between attributes and these
information is defined. Capability of evidence verification and restrictions must be de-
fined by PP/ST author.
FCO_NRR.2 Enforced proof of receipt
This SFR consists of there elements. In the first element, proof of receipt will be gen-
erated for which information types is defined. Attributes of user defined information,
capability of evidence verification and restriction requirements are defined in this section
for proof of receipt.
Note: Proof of origin and proof of receipt are also part of the blockchain ledger. Since
the transaction records are open to the public in the Bitcoin, anyone can read ledger and
track the transactions. Blockchain structure requires transactions to be signed by sender
in order to be checked by the receiver. Since signing process is handled inside the wallets,
these SFRs are associated to the wallets and all of them provides these specifications.
3.4.1.3 Cryptographic Support Class (FCS)
In this class, security requirements for cryptographic functions are detailed. Key gener-
ation, key destruction and cryptographic operation details will be defined for cryptocur-
rency wallets.
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
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Requirement for generation of blockchain related keys, algorithms, key sizes and corre-
sponding standards are defined here.
For example, since Bitcoin uses Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA),
key length of 32 bytes and curve which is secp256k1, algoritm, key size and the standard
in which this algorithm defined must be listed here.
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
This SFR is dependent on key generation SFR which is defined above because destruction
is bounded to the production. To safely destroy sensitive keys, destruction methods could
be defined according to a standard. Author can assign key destruction method and list
related standards or define a new method in this requirement.
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
The assignment of which cryptographic operations are used by the wallets and which
standards will be used in accordance with the operations are defined in this SFR. Crypto-
graphic operation such as signing of transactions can be detailed with key size, algorithm
and reference standard.
3.4.1.4 User Data Protection Class (FDP)
The requirement for authorization mechanism, complexity and specifications such as two
factor, multi factor authentications, password and PIN usage are detailed in the following
SFRs.
FDP_ACC.2 Complete access control
This SFR requires a user defined security functional policy about access control. In
this policy, developers must define all possible operations of subjects on objects. TOE
security functionality will cover all operations in this policy to protect user data during
access control.
FDP_DAU.1 Basic Data Authentication
Verification of the validity or authenticity of information content during authentication
is provided by basic data authentication SFR. One-way hash functions might satisfy this
Chapter 3. Common Criteria 41
requirement. List of objects or information types must be defined by PP/ST writer.
According to the first element in this SFR, TOE security functionality will be capable of
providing evidence for this user-defined information. In the second element, it is defined
that which subjects will be able to verify the validity of evidence with the indicated
information. This SFR is intended the protection of static data instead of transaction
data.
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
Identification of information flow control policy is defined in this family. Beyond tradi-
tional mechanisms, non-interference policies, state-transitions, subjects, operations and
the information under control of the policy are defined in this SFR. Level of information
flow control policy could be defined either low level or high level. Since complete control
of the information flow might not be required, only subset information flow control SFR
is defined here. There is also complete information flow control SFR in CC standard but
subset information flow control policy gives author more flexibility.
FDP_ITT.1 Basic internal transfer protection
If there is data exchange between physically-separated TOE parts, basic internal transfer
protection SFR is used to define enforcement of access control and information flow
control policies. The aim is to provide protection for disclosure, modification and loss of
user data. If a physically-separated crypto wallet is designed by manufacturers, internal
transfer protection can be provided by this SFR.
Since the protection of data flowing between TOE parts is guaranteed, internal transfer
of sensitive information between parts of hardware wallets will be protected by this SFR.
Also software wallets are protected by this SFR since they are installed on hardware
components and similar protection mechanisms are applied for security of information
flow.
FDP_ITT.3 Integrity monitoring
Access control and information flow control policies mentioned in the previous SFR is
used here to monitor integrity of user data for the errors defined by PP/ST author. Also,
any action could be specified to be taken upon the integrity error.
For example, if a user data integrity error is detected, wallet could be locked and no
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transaction is allowed, even private keys could be erased and user is warned. Also, this
process could be applied for other data protection SFRs.
FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
The protection of residual information is provided by this SFR. The definition of which
objects are to be protected during allocation of the resource to or deallocation of the
resource from must be specified.
FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity monitoring and action
In this SFR, TOE security functionality monitor stored user data and take necessary
actions for integrity errors based on the user-defined attributes. Actions to be taken are
also not defined in the CC standard and left to the PP/ST author.
FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality
Confidentiality of data during transmit and receive is enforced in this SFR with the help
of access control and information flow control policies.
FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity
Besides confidentiality of data defined above, integrity of exchanged data must be en-
forced by access control and information flow control policies in a manner protected
against one or more selection of modification, deletion, insertion and replay errors. TOE
is expected to notice these kind of errors on receipt of user data.
3.4.1.5 Identification and Authentication Class (FIA)
Functional requirements for user identity verification are addressed in this class. Identi-
fication or authentication is used to ensure correctness of associated security attributes
of users and it is important for the enforcement of security policies. FIA Class covers
verifying and determining of user identity, associated roles or groups and authority on
TOE. Other SFR classes are dependent on correct implementation of these requirements
in order to be effective.
Authentication requirements are used in this part rather than identification, because wal-
lets are generally personal and there is no multiple user distinction. In the blockchain,
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identity of a user is defined by the address produced in the wallets. It is sufficient to
authenticate the user in order to reach this address and perform transactions. Authen-
tication requirements are defined below.
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
In case of an authentication failure, TOE security functionality shall detect when an
administrator defined number of unsuccessful attempts occurred. Also, the policy of
required actions during the failure must be defined by PP/ST writer. The example of
detection could be wrong PIN entry of certain times and the action could be adding wait
time, blocking user for a period of time or a series of recovery steps. BitBox hardware
wallet lets 15 failed attempts before unlocking device and after this level it erases all
secret data [8].
FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets
TOE security functionality must provide verification of secrets mechanism meeting a
certain quality metric which should be defined by developer. Quality metrics of user
authentication passwords or PINs defined here.
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action
Adding this SFR in a PP provides successful authentication requirement of user before
any security functionality related action.
FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms
Multiple authentication mechanisms are defined in this SFR to support user authentica-
tion. The use of this requirement will also become widespread as multiple authenticated
wallets are being used. As a good example for this requirement Electrum wallet uses
multisignature wallet mechanism and requires more than one key at the same time. Also
two factor authentication which is using multi-signature mechanism increases security.
FIA_UAU.6 Re-authenticating
Re-authentication conditions could be defined in this SFR. If a developer want to re-
authenticate user after each transaction, it must be stated in this requirement. These
conditions may include idle time, number of transactions or any other conditions.
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FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback
During the authentication, the feedback on the process might be sensitive. In such cases,
the content of the data may be concealed in order not to release important information.
Displaying star character instead of password, not displaying number of characters, feed-
back of general info instead of failed mechanism info could protect elements of this
process.
3.4.1.6 Security Management Class (FMT)
We did not define any security requirement about security management functions. Since
there is no control of users and attributes in cryptocurrency wallets, management system
is not fully used. There is no user management or process management requiring security
attributes. Owner or any user knowing the authentication information, PIN or password,
can use the wallet and authenticate transactions. This class can be added and defined
by ST authors according to further design details.
3.4.1.7 Privacy Class (FPR)
In this class privacy requirements can be defined on four ways; anonymity, pseudonymity,
unlinkability and unobservability. Since Bitcoin is public and permissionless blockchain,
there is no requirement of privacy. For users who want to be anonymous, there are some
wallets such as Darkwallet providing anonymization by obfuscating transactions. Since
wallets does not require such privacy to be more secure, these SFRs are not included in
this work.
3.4.1.8 Protection of the TSF Class (FPT)
FPT class ensures the protection of integrity and management mechanisms of TOE
Security Functionality (TSF) and corresponding data against tampering and bypass.
TSF serves as the guard of the TOE. There is another protection mechanisms called
FDP User Data Protection class but the difference between FPT class and FDP User
Data Protection class is that one focuses on user data while other one focuses on TSF
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data. Following SFRs define different aspects of protecting TOE security functionality
and they required for hardware attacks defined in chapter 5.
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
This SFR ensures that in case of a failure, TOE will preserve secure state and will not
lead to any compromise. List of failure types must be defined by PP/ST writer.
FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
According to this SFR, during the TSF data transmitting between separate parts of the
TOE, protection must be maintained against disclosure and/or modification.
FPT_ITT.3 TSF data integrity monitoring
This SFR requires TSF to be able to detect and act upon one or more of modification,
substitution, re-ordering, deletion of transmitting data between separate parts of the
TOE. Also, the actions that shall be taken must be defined here upon detection of such
integrity errors.
FPT_PHP.2 Notification of physical attack
TSF could be protected by physical aspects. First level of physical protection which
is detection and notification of attacks is defined in here. TOE must detect physical
tampering that might compromise the TSF and determine the occurrence level. After
the detection, user must be notified about which device or element is tampered.
Hardware cryptocurrency wallets have to be protected against physical attacks. Notifi-
cation of tampering will provide owner to be cautious and not to use vulnerable product.
This level of protection ensures only the notification of attack. Users can be alerted by
product-dependent features such as warning messages, sounds etc. Also tamper evident
seals could be used on the physical junction parts.
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
Increased security provides resistance against physical tampering situations by automatic
response. After the detection of defined attack scenarios, TOE will enforce security
mechanisms and resist not to compromise any vulnerability. This requirement could
cover not only invasive attacks but also semi-invasive and non-invasive attacks. Physical
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barriers, hard enclosures, sensors could be used against direct physical attacks. Non-
invasive attacks like power analysis could be prevented by other software and hardware
methods.
FPT_RCV.1 Manual recovery
Another physical protection mechanism is when a failure or service discontinuity occurs,
TOE enters a maintenance mode to maintain secure state. A service personnel or au-
thorized intervention is required in order to check the system and return to the secure
state.
FPT_RPL.1 Replay detection
During the communication, replay detection and other corresponding actions must be
provided according to this SFR against attackers who are performing man in the middle
attack. Clipboard copy protection may also be considered under this requirement.
FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
This requirement defines the requirement of reliable time stamps. Since blockchain
records use time stamping as proof, reliable functionality is important.
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
Correct operation of a device must be controlled by self tests. Conditions and timing of
self tests are defined in this requirement. Self tests could be implemented for TSF or TSF
data at initial start-up, at user requests, during periodic controls in normal operation or
at user defined conditions.
3.4.1.9 Resource Utilization Class (FRU)
This class has SFRs organizing fault tolerance, priority of services and resource allocation
specifications.
FRU_FLT.2 Limited fault tolerance
Fault tolerance of wallets related to random number generation, flow of data, crypto-
graphic operations and environmental faults like power supply are defined in this SFR.
Errors detected by sensors also subjects of fault tolerance.
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3.4.1.10 TOE Access Class (FTA)
This class contains the TOE access requirements for user session establishment. User
session which is the interaction of user and system should be established according to
identification and authentication attributes. Security must be considered at the begin-
ning of the initial interaction. Following SFRs are defined for secure cryptocurrency
wallets.
FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination
An interactive session must be terminated after a short interval of inactivity. If a user
forgets to log out or turn off the wallet interface, this requirement will protect active
session.
FTA_SSL.4 User-initiated termination
Besides automatic termination, TOE security functionality may allow user to terminate
own session to maintain protection.
FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE access banners
This requirement can be used to generate a warning message if an advisory message or a
confirmation sign is required. Wallets can display a user defined unique figure or phrase
to let him confirm it is valid and correct. This requirement can protect wallet to be
replaced with a fake one.
FTA_TAH.1 TOE access history
Display of unsuccessful session establishment attempts lets user understand when, where
and how a malicious attacker tried to tamper the TOE. Also, successful session establish-
ment information lets user see previous correct attempts, so that user can check whether
someone else logged in or not. The access history is recommended not to be erased before
reviewed by user.
3.4.1.11 Trusted Path/Channels Class (FTP)
While performing direct interaction with the TOE, users and other IT products need
trusted path which is providing confidence. Trusted path protects from security breaches
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resulting from untrusted applications. The conditions of secure communication channels
are defined in the following SFRs.
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
In this SFR, it is stated that protection of communication channel must be provided by
TOE from modification and disclosure and the channel must be logically distinct from
other channels. TOE or other IT products can initiate communication and PP author
can define for which functions a trusted channel is required.
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path
Similarly, TOE security functionality must provide secure communication against mod-
ification and disclosure. TOE shall permit and require users to initiate trusted commu-
nication and use it.
3.4.1.12 Extended Security Functional Requirements
Extended SFRs are defined additionally when the requirements in the standard are not
enough to cover all functionality.
FPT_EMS.1 Emanation Security
Since there is no security requirement in the CC standard about electromagnetic ema-
nation, we define the requirement in this section. During the cryptographic operations
in hardware wallets, it is expected that malicious users cannot obtain useful information
via physical emanations.
FCS_RNG.1 Random Number Generation
Random Number Generation is used for cryptographic operations. Quality metrics must
be defined to obtain high quality random numbers. So that, functional requirement
for this mechanism is defined in this family. PP/ST author could define which quality
tests would be done, what will be the entropy level and what is expected from random
number source. A recognized methodology e.g. AIS31 or ISO/IEC 18031 standard could
be selected to comply with international standards.
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Table 3.3 lists the relationship of Security Objectives with SFRs. Each SFR takes an
important role to achieve the requirements of corresponding Security Objectives.
Table 3.3: Matching of Security Objectives and SFRs
Security Objectives Related SFR ans SFR Description
OT.Access FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FDP_ACC.2 Complete access control
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action
FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.6 Re-authenticating
FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback
OT.ReverseEngineering FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FDP_ACC.2 Complete access control
FDP_ITT.3 Integrity monitoring
FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity monitoring and action
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action
FPT_ITT.3 TSF data integrity monitoring
FPT_PHP.2 Notification of physical attack
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
FPT_RPL.1 Replay detection
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
OT.FakeAddress FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FDP_ITT.1 Basic internal transfer protection
FDP_ITT.3 Integrity monitoring
FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality
FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity
FPT_RPL.1 Replay detection
FCO_NRO.2 Enforced proof of origin
FCO_NRR.2 Enforced proof of receipt
OT.Reflashing FDP_ITT.3 Integrity monitoring
FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity monitoring and action
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FPT_ITT.3 TSF data integrity monitoring
FPT_PHP.2 Notification of physical attack
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
OT.Replacing FDP_ACC.2 Complete access control
FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE access banners
FTA_TAH.1 TOE access history
OT.WeakAuthentication FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
FDP_DAU.1 Basic Data Authentication
FDP_ACC.2 Complete access control
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets
FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms
OT.Eavesdropping FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
FDP_ITT.1 Basic internal transfer protection
FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality
FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination
FTA_SSL.4 User-initiated termination
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path
OT.Storage FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
FDP_ITT.3 Integrity monitoring
FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity monitoring and action
FPT_ITT.3 TSF data integrity monitoring
FPT_PHP.2 Notification of physical attack
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
OT.InformationLeakage FDP_ITT.1 Basic internal transfer protection
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FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
FPT_EMS.1 Emanation Security
OT.Hardware FAU_ARP.1 Security alarms
FPT_PHP.2 Notification of physical attack
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
OT.Malfunction FAU_ARP.1 Security alarms
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity monitoring and action
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
FRU_FLT.2 Limited fault tolerance
FPT_PHP.2 Notification of physical attack
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
FCS_RNG.1 Random Number Generation
OT.Audit FAU_ARP.1 Security alarms
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review
FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
OT.KeyCompromise FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
FDP_ACC.2 Complete access control
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action
OT.FailSecure FAU_ARP.1 Security alarms
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FDP_ITT.3 Integrity monitoring
FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity monitoring and action
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
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FRU_FLT.2 Limited fault tolerance
FPT_ITT.3 TSF data integrity monitoring
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
FPT_RCV.1 Manual recovery
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
OT.Integrity FAU_ARP.1 Security alarms
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FDP_ITT.1 Basic internal transfer protection
FDP_ITT.3 Integrity monitoring
FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity monitoring and action
FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality
FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity
FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
FPT_ITT.3 TSF data integrity monitoring
FPT_RPL.1 Replay detection
FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
The SFRs described in this chapter are matched in table 3.4 by selecting the appropriate
ones for the hardware and software wallets. We grouped mobile, desktop and online
wallets as software wallets because they have almost the same functional characteristics.
Table 3.4 shows that all SFRs in the list are applicable to the hardware wallets. But it
does not mean that one hardware wallet must implement all of them. Developers can
choose some of them to increase functional specifications but they have to implement
the ones that are related to the protection. In the next chapter, the need for protection
will be explained by examples.
Table 3.4: Matching of SFRs and Wallet Types
SFR Hardware Software
FAU_ARP.1 Security alarms X
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation X X
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FAU_SAR.1 Audit review X X
FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review X X
FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage X X
FCO_NRO.2 Enforced proof of origin X X
FCO_NRR.2 Enforced proof of receipt X X
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation X X
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction X X
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation X X
FDP_ACC.2 Complete access control X X
FDP_DAU.1 Basic Data Authentication X X
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control X X
FDP_ITT.1 Basic internal transfer protection X
FDP_ITT.3 Integrity monitoring X
FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection X X
FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity monitoring and action X X
FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality X X
FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity X X
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling X X
FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets X X
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action X X
FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms X X
FIA_UAU.6 Re-authenticating X X
FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback X X
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state X X
FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection X
FPT_ITT.3 TSF data integrity monitoring X
FPT_PHP.2 Notification of physical attack X
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack X
FPT_RCV.1 Manual recovery X
FPT_RPL.1 Replay detection X X
FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps X X
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing X X
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FRU_FLT.2 Limited fault tolerance X X
FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination X X
FTA_SSL.4 User-initiated termination X X
FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE access banners X
FTA_TAH.1 TOE access history X X
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel X X
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path X X
FPT_EMS.1 Emanation Security X
FCS_RNG.1 Random Number Generation X X
Chapter 4
Hardware Wallet Design within CC
Framework
4.1 Secure Hardware Wallet Design
We have designed a hardware cryptocurrency wallet based on the protection mechanisms
we have identified in table 5.1 and security objectives in chapter 3. In the following
subsections, functionality of our wallet device is described as physical and logical scope.
Besides keeping keys in a protected area, this device is also designed to provide following
services:
• Passwords Management,
• Personal Identifier and Authenticator,
• Contactless Payment Card,
• Data Encryptor working on USB or NFC connection,
• FIDO (Fast IDentity Online) Authenticator.
4.1.1 Physical Scope of Wallet Design
The wallet we have designed will have at least the following hardware features:
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• Wallet will have overall physical protection. Hard metal enclosure will be used.
• Security sensors, detection switches as shown on figure 4.1 will be used.
• Screen, fingerprint reader, NFC and USB could be used for 2 factor authentication.
• Payment address will be shown to be 6 characters in a row so that the user can
easily control it.
• Internal battery for sensors will provide continuation of security when main battery
is run out.
• All sensitive key will be stored in secure area.
Secure Chip
From the functional requirements we defined, we can say that the heart of the physical
scope is the secure chip. In addition to reducing security concerns, it also relieves design-
ers’ burden. Since most of the secure chips are evaluated and certified according to CC,
it is convenient to choose one of those. Secure boot, secure memory, crypto co-processors
and security sensors are some elements of those chips which makes them different. The
design of secure chips primarily ensures resistance to attacks. If the resistance disappears,
the response mechanisms against attacks are activated and the protected assets are ze-
roized to prevent from reaching the attacker. Although the chip is so safe, additional
physical security measures need to be taken into account.
Communication Interfaces
Communication channels can be determined according to the needs of the users. We put
Near Field Channel (NFC) and Universal Serial Bus (USB) interfaces into our design
considering the future payment trends. Bluetooth and wireless communication are also
other options that can be easily added. The NFC feature will be turned off when the
device is not in use.
User Interface
We chose a large color touch screen in our design. The display can be redesigned accord-
ing to power consumption and users’ feedback.
Covers
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The outer covers of the device are designed to be tamper resistant and tamper proof.
In this way, the first measure will be taken against attackers. Covers will have sensitive
tamper detection switches connected to the secure chip. If tampering is performed with-
out the intervention of the service officer, it will provide evidence and detection. The
design also has a led indicator and fingerprint reader on the front side cover.
Figure 4.1: Physical Wallet Design
PCB Design
We have designed a safe area to protect the sensitive information. For this purpose,
protective mesh sensor is recommended. It is an electrode layer consisting of conductive
lines throughout the surface and connected to the secure chip. In case of any change
of the signal on conductive lines, secure chip detects tamper. For an additional layer,
epoxy based potting resin can be covered around the sensitive areas.
There is a small battery on the printed circuit board (PCB) for oﬄine security. It will
provide required power for mesh and tamper switch sensors when the main battery is
run out.
4.1.2 Logical Scope of Wallet Design
The wallet we have designed will have at least the following logical features:
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Figure 4.2: Software Wallet Design
• Audit data generation for every action, audit review restriction before authentica-
tion and storage protection.
• Generating cryptographic keys from internal true random number generator, de-
structing key and secure memory cleaning after expire. Applying constant time
and adding random operations provide protection against side channel attacks.
• Requiring authentication for every action, asking at least 8 digits PIN and applying
30 seconds waiting time after 3 failed attempts, wiping the data after 5 wrong
attempts. Re-authentication is also required for every coin transaction. On every
start-up user will be notified with a pre-defined figure to show the validity of wallet
and if there is a failed login attempt user will be warned.
• Data protection is applied on storage and during communication through authen-
ticity, integrity and confidentiality. Obfuscation, encryption, power-on self-test,
redundancy check, signature verification, memory management, replay detection,
secure communication and address randomization techniques will be used.
• When a security breach or error is detected and if this situation is not in fault
tolerance limits, owner will be notified and secure state will be preserved.
Cryptographic Operations
To achieve cryptographic operations required for blockchain transactions and authenti-
cations, every wallet device needs to implement certain algorithms. Since cryptographic
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operations needs random keys, we generate unique random numbers in our secure chip
(FCS_RNG.1). These random numbers are used to generate cryptographic keys, public-
private key pairs, encryption keys etc. (FCS_CKM.1). These keys are used for sign-
ing/verifying transactions and encryption/decryption of user data (FCS_COP.1). There
is also a key destruction feature for safe disposal of used keys (FCS_CKM.4).
Data Protection/Integrity
We have defined an access control security functional policy to determine scope of control.
In our wallet, complete access control is implemented to ensure all operations and they
are covered by the policy (FDP_ACC.2).
To protect transaction data, user is required to sign it. This functionality provides both
basic data authentication and enforced proof of origin (FDP_ACC.2, FCO_NRO.2)
Receiver can verify sender with the proof that is provided by sender (FCO_NRR.2).
During flow of information, security attributes need to be protected. For this reason
information flow control functionality is included in the product (FDP_IFC.1).
To protect user data while it is transmitted between parts of the device there is another
policy (FDP_ITT.1). Besides protection, integrity monitoring of user data is ensured.
In case of an integrity error is detected, device may ask the data again or enter the failure
mode to maintain secure state (FDP_ITT.3).
When a transaction is completed or a cryptographic key is destructed, there must be no
residual information or it must not be accessible. There is a mechanism to ensure that
resources are unavailable upon allocation or de-allocation (FDP_RIP.1).
The integrity of stored data is ensured by another functional requirement. Device moni-
tors user data stored in the memory against identified integrity errors and takes necessary
actions if a detection occurs (FDP_SDI.2).
To protect user data during a transfer between device and any application, security
mechanisms of data exchange confidentiality and data exchange integrity are defined
(FDP_UCT.1, FDP_UIT.1).
Alarm/Audit
Security alarm in case of a potential violation detection can be classified in this subsystem
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(FAU_ARP.1). In our wallet, a warning message on screen will be displayed and no
action will be available, only maintenance mode will be available to the technical service
personnel.
This subsystem defines security audit functionality which includes generation and viewing
of audit data (FAU_GEN.1 and FAU_SAR.1). Audit capability of device consists of
recording system processes and user actions. Also in our design, audit review requires
authentication mechanism (FAU_SAR.2). Audit trail storage will be big enough to keep
every action in the wallet for one month and protection of stored audit data will be
maintained (FAU_STG.1).
Identification/Authentication
Another functionality in this subsystem is authentication of user. Before any action, user
must be authenticated (FIA_UAU.2).
In case of unsuccessful attempts reach a certain number, waiting time is applied. This
will reduce the possibility of guessing attacks. Also the authentication will be blocked if
10 unsuccessful attempts are detected (FIA_AFL.1).
Strong PINs, at least 6 or 8 characters, will be asked by the system (FIA_SOS.1). There
is an option to use multiple authentication mechanism so that user can choose multi-
signature mechanism, fingerprint, verification by SMS or other mechanisms (FIA_UAU.5).
For every transaction, our design requires user authentication. Even if a user forgets to
log off, the attackers cannot perform new transactions without passing authentication
mechanism (FIA_UAU.6).
One of the authentication precaution is that the authentication feedback protection.
While users entering PIN, it will not be displayed as plain-text on the wallet screen
(FIA_UAU.7).
While device is turning on it will display a user defined message or figure to be ensure
that device belongs to the owner (FTA_TAB.1).
Physical Protection/Monitoring
Physical protection mechanisms include not only protection of internal transfer but also
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monitoring integrity of security functionality data (FPT_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.3). Com-
promise or altering of data flowing between physical parts of the device may cause mal-
function and loss of assets. Device has a mechanism to detect replay of transmitting
data (FPT_RPL.1). Also, in our wallet design, notification of physical attacks and re-
sistance to the physical attacks are most important specifications to enhance reliability
(FPT_PHP.2, FPT_PHP.3). Cold wallets, known as the most secure wallets, is oﬄine so
that the security of sensitive data is mostly relied upon physical protection mechanisms.
Besides tampering, emanation is another issue that needs to be protected, so there are
required physical and software measures in proposed wallet design (FPT_EMS.1).
In case of a hardware failure occurs or an attack to the hardware is detected and device
cannot repair itself to continue normal operation, protection mechanism will preserve
secure state and security sensors will continue to be active (FPT_FLS.1). It will ask for
user intervention to return to the normal state (FPT_RCV.1).
This subsystem also protects functionality of time stamps. Since every process and trans-
action is recorded in the blocks of Bitcoin, a reliable time stamp is required (FPT_STM.1).
Lastly, we can include self-tests that are a must for a system. Wallet will carry out self
tests at start-up and periodically while working (FPT_TST.1).
Since availability is an important concern, our wallet is designed to continue working
in case of acceptable errors. To achieve this, in the occurrence of identified failures,
wallet will continue to normal operations. Failures are not related to security such
as unavailability of communication channels or failure of additional applications etc.
(FRU_FLT.2).
Communication/Trusted Path
Between user interface on desktop or mobile and device, there must be a secure com-
munication channel against disclosure and modification of data. In our device, trusted
paths are used for both initial authentication process and transaction establishment pro-
cess. Secure communication will be established from the initial communication to the
end (FTP_TRP.1).
We have defined a security policy to maintain trusted channel for updating the software
and firmware of the device. Upon the mutual control of the certificates, both parties
will allow to continue update. Only the device will initiate the update process with the
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user’s approval (FTP_ITC.1).
The secure channel between device and other parties could be terminated by device
security functionality in case of an idle time is reached. If there is no user interaction
for 1 minute the channel will be closed and re-establishment is required (FTA_SSL.3).
Also, we allow user to terminate his own interactive session (FTA_SSL.4).
After the owner of the wallet turns on the device and confirms that it belongs to him, the
first thing he will see is the previous unsuccessful attempts. Date, time and number of
attempts will prove that malicious people made unauthorized attempts (FTA_TAH.1).
Chapter 5
Comparative Security Analysis of
Cryptocurrency Wallets
In this section, we will analyze the real examples of security problems and categorize
attacks. These real examples will reveal how important the security recommendations
we offer. Then we will analysis cryptocurrency wallets comparatively according to the
security objectives that we proposed.
5.1 Attacks and Prevention Methods in terms of Common
Criteria
5.1.1 Malware Attacks
Bitcoin theft from a wallet is direct way of stealing with malware. As stated in a journal
in 2011 [72], a trojan horse named Infostelar.Coinbit which attempts to steal Bitcoin
wallets was discovered. This malware was searching Bitcoin wallet in windows operating
systems. After locating the wallet, it uploads private keys using FTP to a remote server.
It is reported that about 25000 Bitcoin were stolen with this method.
This was the first level of attack on low-security wallets. Although encrypting wallet data
could increase security one step ahead and mitigate simpler attacks, it may not block
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attackers since there are other ways of stealing. For holistic safety, security objectives
defined for TOE and environment in chapter 3 must be applied.
Another way of stealing Bitcoin with the help of malware is to use clipboard hijacking.
This kind of malware hijacks windows clipboard and replace the content. When a user
copy a Bitcoin address, the receiving address will be different then the intended one.
Symantec has discovered the first malware called Trojan.Coinbitclip on February 2, 2016
[73].
Related Threats: T.Compromise, T.UnauthorizedAccess, T.FakeAddress
Related Assumptions: A.SecurePlatform, A.EducatedTrustedUsers
Related OSPs: P.StrongAuth, P.BackUp
Related Security Objectives: OT.Access, OT.FakeAddress, OT.Audit, OE.DataImport,
OE.Platform, OE.Users, OE.FakeAddress
Prevention Methods:
• Since the attack is targeting windows operating systems, TOE environment is ex-
pected to notify, resist and block such kind of malware attacks.
• Users are expected to be cautious not to share folders containing Bitcoin application
[74].
• Instead of storing keys in local storage, password-protected wallets as stated in
[74] could be used to mitigate such attacks. But in this case, attackers can use
keyloggers to get users passwords and then encrypt files. Other precautions must
be applied against these methods.
5.1.2 Unauthorized Access to the Hot Wallets
Hot wallets whet attackers appetite since they can be attacked at all times. Mt.Gox,
an online largest currency exchange was hacked due to the lack of some serious security
objectives such as version control software, testing policy and proper management [75].
Similarly, Bitcoinica, an exchange having always online hot wallets lost its wallets twice
in three months [74]. In the first attack, a security breach at cloud service provider
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Linode allowed attackers to steal about $210,000 from Bitcoinica. The second attack
caused not only lose of $87,000 but also lose of client accounts and transaction history.
Also it is commented that hackers captured webserver and reset the password.
Another hack due to the poor security measures happened to Coincheck, one of the
biggest exchange in Japan. According to revealed details of the exchange’s security, they
were not using recommended multi-sig security and storing all currencies in a single hot
wallet [76].
Related Threats: T.Compromise, T.UnauthorizedAccess, T.WeakAuthentication,
T.Eavesdropping
Related Assumptions: A.SecurePlatform, A.EducatedTrustedUsers
Related OSPs: P.StrongAuth, P.BackUp
Related Security Objective: OT.Access, OT.WeakAuthentication, OT.Audit,
OT.Eavesdropping, OE.DataImport, OE.Platform, OE.Components, OE.StrongAuth
Prevention Methods:
Both Mt.Gox and Bitcoinica attacks could be mitigated by two-factor or multi-factor
authentication mechanisms. Also, storing large amounts in hot wallets is very high risk.
Here are some of the recommendations for cryptocurrency users :
• Storing more Bitcoin outside of cold storage than one can afford is not recom-
mended.
• Depositing to the cold storage is better way of saving if cold storage is protected
correctly.
• From cold storage to the hot storage coin transfer should be done manually.
• Small amounts of withdrawals must not be ignored, it could be an attacker dis-
guising a theft.
• Backing up the database to a secure place could protect from modification or
deletion.
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5.1.3 DDoS Attacks
The purpose of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks are filling the bandwidth
or resource of a targeted system with multiple users, not to allow legitimate parties to
access the site or service. According to a report released by Imperva Incapsula, Bitcoin
was one of the top-10 most targeted industries [77]. This attack may not be directly
related to theft of coins but the effect of DDoS attack could be worldwide and may lead
to a fall in prices as seen before [78]. In 2013, after a DDoS attack to the Mt.Gox, price
of the Bitcoin went down from above $100 to the $55. At the end of 2017, Bitfinex,
a cryptocurrency exchange went oﬄine due to the DDoS attack. Severe losses were
reported after this attack and some coin prices were decreased by as much as 90% [79].
Other attacks such as Bittrex and Bitcoin Gold have also been reported. It should be
noted that only cloud wallets and exchange platforms can be attacked by this method
but the effect could be universal.
Another version of DDoS attacks is mentioned by Gkaniatsou et al. in [29] saying that
it can also be applied at command layer by tampering the transaction data and conse-
quently blocking hardware dongle interpretation and transaction verification.
Related Threats: T.DDoS
Related Assumptions: A.SecurePlatform, A.EducatedTrustedUsers
Related OSPs: P.BackUp
Related Security Objective: OT.FailSecure, OT.Malfunction
Prevention Method
• In case a DDoS attack is detected, firstly the type and source must be identified.
Then, related mitigation techniques must be applied.
• Applying custom web application firewall rules, using traffic monitoring tools could
help to reduce the affect of attacks.
• Platform and network system must be established enough to maintain high level
of traffic.
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5.1.4 Phishing Attacks
In these attacks, the attacker sends an e-mail that imitates a person or an organization
that requires the victim to click on the link, thus allowing the attacker to access critical
data or information. If a victim clicks on the fake link, a malware could be downloaded
to desktop or mobile platform. Hot wallets are more prone to this kind of attacks.
In 2015, The Information Security Manager of Bitstamp clicked on the link in these
messages and downloaded malicious software to the computer. As a result, the stock
market was hacked and 19,000 BTCs were stolen at 5 million dollars on time . After
this event, Bitstamp partnered with BitGo for multiple signature protection on crypto
money transactions and transferred 98% of its digital assets to cold wallets [80].
Related Threats: T.Compromise, T.UnauthorizedAccess, T.ReverseEngineering,
T.FakeAddress, T.WeakAuthentication, T.Eavesdropping, T.UnauthorizedUpdate
Related Assumptions: A.SecurePlatform, A.EducatedTrustedUsers, A.Update
Related OSPs: P.StrongAuth, P.BackUp
Related Security Objectives: OT.Access, OT.ReverseEngineering,
OT.WeakAuthentication, OT.Eavesdropping, OT.FakeAddress, OT.FailSecure,
OT.Audit, OE.DataImport, OE.Platform, OE.Users, OE.FakeAddress, OE.Components,
OE.StrongAuth,
Prevention Method
• The best method of protection from these attacks is to educate the users to take
adequate precautions.
• Also, the system would be designed with up to date intrusion prevention and
detection systems.
• Control and restriction of admin and user rights must be defined.
• Using cold wallet and multi-signature mechanism could provide significant security.
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5.1.5 Man In The Middle Attacks
Man-in-the-middle attack (MITM) is based on the principle of seeing and capturing the
data between sender and receiver. If the attacker only watches the traffic and do not
changes anything, this is called passive attack. If the transmitting data is altered and
forwarded, this is called active attack. Fake address threat is defined according to this
attack.
In terms of cryptocurrency wallets, MITM is applicable to mostly online (hot) wallets.
The interception is more possible in these systems. But as mentioned in [29] by Gka-
niatsou et al., through the sniffing communication between API and dongle, obtaining
keys could be possible. They successfully obtained wallet seed in plaintext which is
transmitted during setup process and able to regenerate master private key by using
known derivation function. Setup process and reinitialization could be started by forc-
ing wrong PIN verification attempts. Also they discovered that in Ledger Nano wallet,
at each login attempt the PIN is transmitted as plaintext and if it is eavesdropped, it
could be captured. By applying active MITM attack, Gkaniatsou et al. proved that
tampering security properties of wallets, learning second factor authentication security
card characters and altering the payment account and address could be possible. To be
able to do these kind of attacks, adversaries have to gain authorization on the network
and computer initially.
Hot wallets are also prone to these attacks since attackers can reach more interface to use
network communication channels. If network security is not fully ensured, these attacks
and Bitcoin loses will be inevitable.
Related Threats: T.FakeAddress, T.Eavesdropping
Related Assumptions: A.SecurePlatform, A.EducatedTrustedUsers, A.SearchPoison
Related Security Objective: OT.FakeAddress, OT.Eavesdropping, OE.DataImport,
OE.Users, OE.Components, OE.FakeAddress
Prevention Method
• Preventing a MITM attack against replacing the sender/receiver address on a hard-
ware wallet is relatively easy. As we have defined an SFR FTA_TAB before, TOE
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could display the address on it and user can check the copied address with the
displayed one.
• Other MITM attacks could be noticed by integrity and confidentiality protection
SFRs.
• Communication channels must be encrypted and strong encryption must be used.
Using virtual private networks might be an easy way of protection.
• Authentication mechanism must be applied before sending any information.
• Hot wallet platforms must have intrusion detection systems monitoring network
and traffic continuously.
5.1.6 Hardware Attacks
Reflashing of hardware wallet memory, tampering of hardware enclosure, storage and
malfunction attacks could be grouped under this title. Hardware related attacks will be
discussed with the experienced examples in the following paragraphs.
Most known hardware wallets which are Trezor One, CoolWallet S, Ledger Nano X,
Ledger Nano S, Ledger Blue, KeepKey and Bitbox have different design and security
countermeasures. Trezor is the first wallet introduced in 2011 while CoolWallet S is
produced in 2014.
As an example for direct hardware wallet attacks we can show that Ledger Nano S
exploitation which is revealed about a year ago. 15 year old Saleem Rashid discovered
that anyone can update the Nano S with the malicious software before generation of the
seed. He took advantage of non-secure processor which is handling operations that do
not require security. Despite there is a secure processor, it does not realize the malicious
code. When the wallet is sent to and used by a user, the attacker can capture everything
[81].
In 2015, a side channel attack is extracted Trezor hardware wallet’s private key. In this
attack, attacker used simple methods of side channel attacks [33]. Based on this attack
Datko et al.developed another attack method and presented that they could achieve
to obtain private key with timing attack vulnerability [32]. Their attack targetted a
common processor which is used in Trezor and KeepKey.
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Volotikin showed that most protected parts of hardware wallets could be exploited [31].
He explained that the ability to create and install wallet application for new cryptocur-
rencies cause vulnerability and an attacker can create malicious wallet application on
hardware wallets. If there is not secure isolation, application can read data from other
containers. He also discovered that this problem could be caused by resetting. Ledger
Nano S does not wipe users’ private data and flash is not cleared upon device reset. He
suggests that all syscall parameters need to be checked and restricted and third party
evaluation is a must for secure solution.
About hardware tampering, it is stated in [82] that Ledger Nano S does not have tamper
evidence case, also debug port is directly accessible. This means that it is prone to any
kind of attacks.
Another Bitcoin hardware wallet Bitfi was examined by two researchers and keys are
extracted [83]. It is discovered that rooting the device does not clean memory and they
can extract secret phrase and salt which are allowing private key generation.
One of the recent attacks is done on Trezor wallet to get PIN through the side channel
attack. In this attack, the physical behaviour of the wallet analyzed and found out that
power traces have leakage information. Attacks succeeded to find the correct PIN of a
Trezor wallet with only 5.5 PIN attempts [84].
Related Threats: T.Compromise, T.UnauthorizedAccess, T.ReverseEngineering,
T.Reflashing, T.Replacing, T.FakeAddress, T.WeakAuthentication, T.Eavesdropping,
T.InformationLeakage, T.Hardware, T.Malfunction, T.UnauthorizedUpdate
Related Assumptions: A.EducatedTrustedUsers, A.Update
Related OSPs: P.StrongAuth, P.BackUp
Related Security Objective: OT.Access, OT.ReverseEngineering, OT.FakeAddress,
OT.Reflashing, OT.Replacing, OT.WeakAuthentication, OT.Eavesdropping,
OT.Storage, OT.InformationLeakage, OT.Hardware, OT.Malfunction, OT.Audit,
OT.KeyCompromise, OT.FailSecure, OT.Integrity, OE.DataImport, OE.Users,
OE.StrongAuth, OE.SafeSeed, OE.FakeAddress, OE.Update
Prevention Method
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• To keep private keys safe, a user should make a copy and store in a protected place.
This could be a paper wallet inside a safe or deposit box.
• Backup keys, passphrases or passwords must not be kept in online devices.
• Multi-signature mechanism keys must be placed separately. If they stay in the
same place, they would be compromised together.
• Keeping large part of the coins in the cold storage and keeping daily operating part
in a hot wallet helps mitigation of losses in case of an attack.
• Multi-factor and multi-signature mechanisms are highly recommended.
• Wallet owners must use strong passwords and unpredictable PINs.
• Wallet manufacturers must design hardware secure enough not to let attackers
pass the security mechanisms. Tamper detection, tamper resistance and tamper
response mechanisms must be used.
• Wallet mechanism should never send private keys outside or wallet never let any
command to get sensitive information. Private keys and seed must be kept isolated.
• Latest version of the wallet software must be used.
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Table 5.1: Experienced Attacks and Proposed Protection Mechanisms
Attack Victim Loss Reason Protection
Mechanisms
Malware At-
tacks
All wallets Unknown Malware and Virus Anti-malware,
anti-virus software,
Educated Users
Unauthorized
Access
Mt.Gox $473 Million Disorganized Orga-
nization
Organized and
Secure
Management
Structure, trusted
platforms, hybrid
hot/cold wallet
system, multisig
Bitcoinica $210,000
and $87,000
Linode, cloud host-
ing platform com-
promised
NiceHash $80 million employee cre-
dentials to gain
access
Coincheck $530 million single hot wallet,
not using multisig
contract security
Implemantation
Weakness
DAO $50 million loophole in the re-
cursive function
software
implementation
test and checksBitfinex $72 million wrong implementa-
tion of multi-sig
wallet, using hot
wallet
Code Vul-
nerability
user "de-
vops199"
$159 million self destruction, ac-
cidentall kill of a
contract
preventing self de-
struction and soft-
ware check
DDoS
BIPS $1 million
nature of web
and network
web application
firewall, DDoS
protection
service, robust
network and
server system
Bitstamp service un-
availability
Bitfinex service un-
availability
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Bittrex service un-
availability
Bitcoin
Gold
service un-
availability
Phishing At-
tack
Bitstamp $5 million uneducated and
careless workers,
hot wallet usage
instrusion de-
tection and pre-
vention systems,
storing in cold
wallet, educated
carefull users, user
credential definion
Man In the
Middle At-
tacks
Ledger
Nano
PIN, Secu-
rity Card
Key
Plaintext PIN
transaction,
Data Encryption
during transaction
Hardware
Attacks
Ledger
Nano S
Code in-
tegrity
non-secure proces-
sor
using secure
processor and
checking
software,
firmware
integrity,
protecting
sensitive data
against side
channel analysis,
obfuscating
operations and
transactions,
scscall parameter
check, zeroisation
of flash and RAM
Trezor cryptographic
keys
no resistance
against side chan-
nel attacks
Keepkey cryptographic
keys
no precaution for
timing attack
Ledger
Nano S
private data,
software in-
tegrity
no isolation, not
cleaning flash after
reset
Ledger
Nano S
Hardware
Integrity
not having tam-
per resistance case,
open debug port
Bitfi extract se-
cret phrase
and salt
not cleaning mem-
ory after root
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5.2 Comparative Analysis of Hardware Wallets
Most known hardware wallets are Trezor One, Trezor T, Ledger Nano S, Ledger Nano
X, Ledger Blue, Keepkey, BitBox, BC Vault and Coolwallet S. Each one of them have
different specifications and design. Table 5.2 represents the specifications of these wallets
according to physical and security aspects.
Table 5.2: Specification of Hardware Wallets
Wallet Display Connection Case Protection Pinpad
Trezor One 128x64 pix-
els
USB Plastic - 2 buttons
Trezor T Color
Touch-
screen
USB Plastic - touchscreen
Ledger
Nano S
250x30 pix-
els
USB steel, plas-
tic
Secure IC,
tamper
proof
2 buttons
Ledger
Nano X
Monochrome Bluetooth Steel, plas-
tic
Secure IC 2 buttons
Ledger Blue Touchscreen USB zamak,
plastic
secure IC,
tamper
proof
touchscreen
Keepkey 256x64 pix-
els
USB Aluminum - one button
BitBox Led Indica-
tor
USB plastic one touch
button
BC Vault 128x64 pix-
els
USB plastic - 4 way con-
trol pad
Coolwallet
S
Monochrome NFC, blue-
tooth
plastic Secure IC,
tamper
proof
one button
5.2.1 Trezor
There is not much difference between Trezor T and Trezor One according to infor-
mation provided by Trezor team. Trezor products verify firmware signature before
installation and boot. If device detects new firmware is not signed by producer it
warns users [85]. This specification corresponds to the FAU_ARP.1, FDP_DAU.1,
FDP_RIP.1, FPT_FLS.1 and FPT_TST.1 SFRs. Similarly, secure update procedure
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provides FDP_RIP.1 functionality which means that memory is erased on firmware up-
date by bootloader and only genuine firmware can restore back. It is stated that boot-
loader is write protected.
Allowance of private and public key operations only after user authentication means that
FIA_UAU.2 is provided.
Ultrasound hardware seal makes the case hard to open and remain proof of tampering but
the plastic case could be considered as low security. Resistance to the physical attacks
by ultrasound seal is covered by FPT_PHP.3 SFR, but if there is no security response
mechanism it means that this SFR is not fully represented. Physical protection consist of
not only invasive attacks but also non-invasive and semi-invasive attacks. In [68], there is
information about countermeasures against side channel attacks by using constant time.
It should be noted that there are other attacks such as power and electromagnetic side
channel attacks, fault injection attacks etc.
In [68], it is stated that authentication security of Trezor is provided by PIN up to 9 digit
numbers. Quality metric of authentication mechanism can be defined in FIA_SOS.1.
It is also stated that waiting time between wrong attempts increases by a power of two
and if 15 unsuccessful attempts are reached, device wipes sensitive data automatically.
This mechanism is related to authentication failure handling SFR which is FIA_AFL.1.
FDP_ACC.2 access control SFR is also covered by authentication functionality.
Reflashing a Trezor device is possible but this attack will cause wiping device stor-
age and giving warning on every start. Against malicious firmware installation, Trezor
devices check integrity and authenticity of firmware [68]. This mechanism represents
that data protection SFRs are applied such as FAU_ARP.1, FDP_ITT.3, FDP_RIP.1,
FDP_SDI.2, FPT_ITT.3 and FPT_TST.1. There are no secure chips inside of the Tre-
zor wallets but they prefer open source software, firmware verification and write-protected
bootloader instead.
Stealing and replacing Trezor wallets with a fake one is prevented by custom home screen
specification. Trezor lets users to choose a unique picture for home screen so that fake
one could be identified easily. FTA_TAB.1 SFR covers this functionality.
FCO_NRO.2 and FCO_NRR.2 proof of origin and receipt SFRs have to be implemented
by the nature of the Bitcoin. We assume that audit data is recorded and reviewed so that
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FAU_GEN.1 and FAU_SAR.1 SFRs are implemented. Since every wallet has crypto
key generation, deletion and operation functionality, FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4 and
FCS_COP.1 SFRs are applied. Tolerance limit for any fault during the operations are
defined in FRU_FLT.2.
Figure 5.1: Trezor One Hardware Wallet [5]
5.2.2 Ledger
The most obvious security feature of ledger is that having a secure element. Secure chip
which is called as secure element provides protection of cryptographic operations and
sensitive data on a high level. Besides isolating external attacks, it mitigates vulnerabili-
ties. This element covers most of the physical functional requirements such as emanation
security, resistance to physical attacks, random number generation and stored data pro-
tection automatically [6]. Reliability of this element comes from third party independent
evaluation against security standards such as CC. Since Ledger’s secure element is cer-
tified according to CC above EAL5 level, most of the SFRs defined in Chapter 3 are al-
ready covered, some of them are FAU_ARP.1, FDP_IFC.1, FDP_ITT.1, FDP_ITT.3,
FDP_RIP.1, FDP_SDI.2, FDP_UCT.1, FPT_ITT.1, FPT_PHP.2, FPT_PHP.3, FPT
_TST.1, FPT_EMS.1, FCS_RNG.1, FRU_FLT.2, FPT_FLS.1, FAU_SAR.1, FDP_
SDC.1, FAU_SAS.1, FCS_RNG.1.
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As in Trezor, Ledger wallets provide 8 digit PIN authentication. They have both plastic
and metal enclosure. Ledger wallets reset to factory settings and erase private keys when
three incorrect PIN attempts reached. Ledger also generated custom operating system
named BOLOS. Ledger states that each time device powered on, a mechanism checks
integrity of software. Ledger Blue has touchscreen and it provides protected authenti-
cation feedback means that no show of PIN characters on screen. These specifications
show that some other SFRs are provided by Ledger wallets.
Figure 5.2: Ledger Hardware Wallet [6]
5.2.3 Keepkey
Keepkey wallet has a combination of up to 9 numbers PIN protection functionality.
The numbers on wallet screen are randomized and they are shown to let the user know
where to click on client side browser software extension. There is no button or touch-
screen on Keepkey. It enforces waiting period after three unsuccessful attempts. The
duration starts at 8 seconds and time continues to double after each wrong attempt.
If there is a malware on PC, it cannot obtain the PIN because the order of the digits
are scrambled. But if there is a shoulder surfer, he can see the PIN characters easily
so we can say that FIA_UAU.7 protected authentication feedback SFR is not applied.
Wallet owners must be warned to keep wallet isolated so that nobody can see the dig-
its. Recovery seed function is also supported which consist of 12 to 24 words. In [86],
Keepkey describes how a wallet owner obtain logs, so we see that audit records are
generated and stored but there is no restriction for audit review. Keepkey’s display
lets users to verify addresses for safe transaction authorization [7]. Also transactions
are signed on the device. It is stated that Keepkey device is not affected by running
malicious code on hardware because there is single privileged process and signature
control [87]. These specifications show that some SFRs are already implemented such
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as FDP_ACC.2, FIA_AFL.1, FDP_DAU.1, FAU_GEN.1, FAU_SAR.1, FIA_SOS.1,
FIA_UAU.2, FPT_PHP.3, FPT_RCV.1, FPT_RPL.1, FPT_TST.1.
Figure 5.3: Keepkey Hardware Wallet [7]
5.2.4 Bitbox
Bitbox cryptocurrency wallet lack of a display so that there is no way of transaction
address confirmation through the hardware wallet screen. Replay detection which is pro-
vided by FPT_RPL.1 SFR is not provided and it is hard to understand if the clipboard
is changed. It supports that displaying transaction info on a smart phone for users to
approve or reject the transaction. Bitbox uses encryption on communication so as to
maintain confidentiality and this provides FCS_CKM.1, FCS_COP.1 and FDP_UCT.1
SFRs. But encryption keys are produced and stored on a normal chip instead of a secure
chip. There are attacks that reveals security breaches of insecure software implementa-
tion [88].
As stated in official developer website [89], Bitbox has true random number generator,
it lets only signed firmware to be installed on device and 2nd factor authentication is
supported with a mobile phone over encrypted USB communication. Micro SD lets
users easy backup the wallet. FCS_RNG.1, FIA_UAU.5 and FPT_RCV.1 SFRs are
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related to these specifications. According to Bitbox user guide, after 15 failed password
attempts, wallet will reset and delete all information [90].
Figure 5.4: Bitbox [8]
5.2.5 BC Vault
BC Vault, relatively new Slovenian product, claims that it offers secure backups while
other wallets do not and also claims that it is the most secure cryptocurrency wallet [9].
It should be kept in mind that other manufacturers make the same claim. BC Vault can
backup private keys as encrypted on micro SD card or as QR code on papers. Wallet
screen provides the transaction details so that sender can check the information. Tam-
per evident enclosure is used to mitigate physical attacks [9]. BC Vault supports PIN
entrance on the device and passwords on the desktop application. Authentication mech-
anism requires at least one of PIN or password. While Ledger and Trezor are providing
hierarchical deterministic key generation which means all keys are generated from a mas-
ter key, a seed, BC Vault generates keys separated from each other. Firmware upgrade
is done after the certificate is signed successfully. It is stated that the application on
the desktop also checks the validity of the transaction signed by device by comparing it
to the original request made on desktop [5]. When we collect all these features we can
say that BC Vault provides FCS_CKM.1, FCS_COP.1, FDP_ACC.2, FDP_IFC.1,
FDP_ITT.3, FDP_UCT.1, FIA_SOS.1, FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UAU.5, FPT_PHP.3,
FPT_RCV.1, FPT_RPL.1, FPT_TST.1 and FCS_RNG.1 SFRs.
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Figure 5.5: BC Vault and Ledger Nano S [9]
5.2.6 Coolwallet S
Another new hardware wallet is Coolwallet S which is using secure element and having
tamper proof design. It provides 2 factor authentication. Recovery seed of 12 to 24
words are created during initialization of wallet and all following keys are derived from
this seed. It supports biometric authentication and the display on the device lets users
to see and confirm the transaction information. The communication between wallet and
mobile app via Bluetooth is encrypted [91]. Like the other wallets using secure chips,
most of the security could easily be attributed to the chip. We accept that the same SFRs
are implemented as in other wallets which are using secure chips. It is also mentioned in
the user manual that address verification is done with Metacert, a protocol protecting the
recipient address [10]. Coolwallet S can be used with a smartphone while sending Bitcoin,
user need to press the button on wallet, then check the amount and address on wallet
display and authenticate on smartphone screen. In this way multi factor authentication
can be achieved.
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Figure 5.6: Coolwallet S [10]
5.3 Analysis and Comparison
In the following table, it will be shown that which security functional requirements are
implemented by which hardware wallet. The meanings of the signs in the table are as
follows:
• X: Device implements the defined SFR
• ? : There is no information about or we could not find whether the device imple-
ments or not
• O: There is no information but due to the nature of the blockchain and coin system
these functionalities are required and accepted as implemented
• 7: As our best knowledge this SFR is not implemented, device does not have this
functionality
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Note: Table 5.3 show best of our knowledge and based on public information available.
The table cannot be referenced before SFRs are officially verified.
Table 5.3: Comparison of the realization of the SFRs by wallets
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FAU_ARP.1 ? ? ? ? ? ? 7 ? ? X
FAU_GEN.1 O O O O O X O O O X
FAU_SAR.1 O O O O O X O O O X
FAU_SAR.2 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? X
FAU_STG.1 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? X
FCO_NRO.2 O O O O O O O O O X
FCO_NRR.2 O O O O O O O O O X
FCS_CKM.1 O O O O O O X X O X
FCS_CKM.4 O O O O O O O O O X
FCS_COP.1 O O O O O O X X O X
FDP_ACC.2 X X X X X X X X X X
FDP_DAU.1 X X O O O X O O O X
FDP_IFC.1 ? ? X X X ? ? X ? X
FDP_ITT.1 ? ? X X X ? ? ? ? X
FDP_ITT.3 X X O O O O O X X X
FDP_RIP.1 X X X X X ? ? ? X X
FDP_SDI.2 X X X X X ? ? ? X X
FDP_UCT.1 ? ? ? ? ? ? X X ? X
FDP_UIT.1 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? X
FIA_AFL.1 X X X X X X X X 7 X
FIA_SOS.1 X X O O O X O X O X
FIA_UAU.2 X X X X X X X X X X
FIA_UAU.5 X X X X X X X X X X
FIA_UAU.6 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? X
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FIA_UAU.7 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? X
FPT_FLS.1 X X X X X O O X X X
FPT_ITT.1 ? ? X X X ? ? ? X X
FPT_ITT.3 X X ? ? ? ? ? ? ? X
FPT_PHP.2 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 X
FPT_PHP.3 X* X* 7 7 7 X* 7 X* 7 X
FPT_RCV.1 X X X X X X X X X X
FPT_RPL.1 ? ? X X X X 7 X X X
FPT_STM.1 O O O O O O O O O X
FPT_TST.1 X X X X X X X X X X
FRU_FLT.2 ? ? X X X ? ? ? X X
FTA_SSL.3 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? X
FTA_SSL.4 O O O O O O O O O X
FTA_TAB.1 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? X
FTA_TAH.1 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? X
FTP_ITC.1 O O O O O O O O O X
FTP_TRP.1 O O X X X O O O O X
FPT_EMS.1 7 7 O O O 7 7 7 O X
FCS_RNG.1 O O X X X O X X X X
* states that even though the functionality is claimed to be applied, we consider that it
is not met at expected level.
The research we have done so far has shown that in order to create a secure product
it is necessary to treat the device as a whole system and identify security problems
accordingly. When we examine each hardware wallet, we see that each one has weaknesses
at different points in their designs. Some of them has weak physical design while some
others have no software countermeasures. Almost all of the hardware wallets are attacked
and discovered that each one of them is vulnerable to different attacks. Table 5.3, except
for the wallet we offer, shows that all the wallets are missing some of the features that
might be related to safety. Thus, as we have already mentioned in the previous sections,
even hardware wallets, claimed to be the most secure wallets, have been attacked and
data leakages occurred. The comparison reveals that using evaluated secure chips to
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protect assets in a wallet is the reliable way and lack of secure chip is very difficult to fill
with software precautions.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
Hardware cryptocurrency wallet presented in this thesis has more security characteristics
and useful design than any other wallet ever made. Comparative analysis shows that the
wallet we have developed has covered all possible aspects of security vulnerabilities, while
other wallets have deficiencies in certain aspects. Proper design allows this device to be
used not only for the cryptocurrency purposes, but also for other ways such as password
management, personal identity etc. Also, the presented work is the first study in the
field of Common Criteria for cryptocurrency wallets and also hardware wallets. As the
security evaluation of the cryptocurrency wallets will be made inevitably, our work will
be the most important resource if the CC is used as an official evaluation methodology.
Recently experienced vulnerabilities and attacks showed that the lack of evaluation in
the test and evaluation leads to huge losses. While researches on blockchain pursued
on alternative cryptocurrency solutions and their further applications, not enough effort
has been put on usability and security certification of wallets. This study will attract
developers, users and CC evaluation labs to put more focus on standardized framework
for this evolving technology.
As a future work, the feasibility studies of the proposed hardware wallet design are
planned to be made. CC evaluation of the wallet in case of a possible production will
be the first officially approved certification. We will leave these works for future projects
as it requires more effort and extends scope of this thesis. We believe that test and
evaluation processes, especially CC framework, would surely contribute to increasing
security of cryptocurrency wallets and developing more secure products.
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